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Abstract of Thesis 
In the Jaws of the Dragon: The United 
States Second Infantry Division in the 
Battle of the Chongchon River. Korea 
November 24 - December 1. 1950
The Battle of the Chongchon River was the worst defeat 
suffered by the U.S. Army since the fall of Bataan and 
Corregidor in 1942, and claimed more American lives than any 
other battle ever fought by the United States in the post- 
World War II era. The United States Second Infantry 
Division was the principal American division engaged in this 
battle, as it fought a desperate rearguard action to hold 
off overwhelming numbers of Chinese soldiers in order to 
allow other American and South Korean divisions to escape to 
safety.
This thesis is a detailed study of the actions fought 
by the United States Second Infantry Division in the Battle 
of the Chongchon River. The thesis utilizes interviews 
conducted by the author with Second Division veterans of the 
battle, as well as official United States Army documents and 
records, to demonstrate that the valiant delaying action 
fought by the Second Division in this battle greatly slowed 
the Chinese Second Phase Offensive and helped to save the 
Eighth United States Army in Korea from destruction.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis provides a detailed examination of the 
actions fought by the United States Second Infantry Division 
in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea. The thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that the Second Infantry Division 
fought valiantly in this battle and greatly slowed the 
Chinese army's Second Phase Offensive, and therefore helped 
prevent the Chinese from accomplishing their strategic 
objective of destroying the Eighth United States Army.
This thesis introduces new information on the Battle of 
the Chongchon River, gathered from the author's interviews 
and correspondence with sixteen veterans of the U.S. Second 
Infantry Division who fought in the battle. The thesis is 
also based on a thorough examination of the U.S. Army's 
official records of the Battle of the Chongchon River, and a 
comprehensive study of the existing literature on the 
subject.
The Battle of the Chongchon River was the worst defeat 
suffered by the United States Army since the surrender of 
Bataan and Corregidor in 1942, and it precipitated the 
longest retreat in the history of the U.S. Army. In the 
forty-three years that have passed since the fight at the 
Chongchon, no battle has claimed more American lives. The 
Second Infantry Division not only suffered more casualties
1
2than any other division in this battle, but also received 
the most post-battle criticism.
Controversy has surrounded the Battle of the Chongchon 
River from the moment it ended. Only weeks after the fight 
at the Chongchon was over, the United States Army launched a 
formal investigation into the reasons for the American 
defeat there. The commanding general of the Second Infantry 
Division, Major General Laurence Keiser, was relieved of 
command by his superior Eighth Army commander Lieutenant 
General Walton Walker. Both Walker and his superior, 
supreme commander General Douglas MacArthur, were also 
heavily criticized for the mistakes they made during the 
battle. Yet in spite of its importance in American military 
history, there has been little scholarly interest in the 
Battle of the Chongchon River.
I was inspired to write about the Battle of the 
Chongchon River in 1987 when, as an undergraduate student 
majoring in History at the University of Nebraska at Omaha,
I read a best-selling book by the British author Max 
Hastings entitled The Korean War.1 Hastings' book was well 
received both in Britain and the United States, and it was 
made a selection of the History Book Club and the Military 
History Book Club. After reading the book I was disturbed 
by many of Hastings' negative, and unsubstantiated, comments 
about the United States Army. His chapter on the Battle of
3the Chongchon River especially outraged me.
When he wrote on the Battle of the Chongchon River in 
his book The Korean War , Hastings completely ignored the 
desperate delaying action fought by the Second Infantry 
Division from November 25-29, 1950, and instead focused his 
attention on the disaster which befell the division on 
November 3 0th along the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road. Hastings 
alleges that the Second Infantry Division performed in a 
cowardly fashion during the battle, and his convoluted prose 
drips with anti-American rhetoric, most of which is 
completely undocumented.2
Among other allegations, Hastings makes the outlandish 
charge that panic stricken soldiers from the Second Infantry 
Division inflicted casualties on the British 27th 
Commonwealth Brigade, as they fired wildly, running away 
from the Chinese ambush.3 This statement is not footnoted, 
and there is absolutely no evidence to support this charge. 
The statement by Hastings is especially infuriating as, by 
his own accounting, the British suffered only 31 casualties 
in this battle. By contrast the U.S. Second Infantry 
Division lost over 4,500 men in the Battle of the Chongchon 
River, more casualties than the British would suffer during 
the entire Korean War. This is a typical example of 
Hastings poor scholarship on the battle in particular, and 
the Korean War in general.
4Lieutenant Colonel Walter Killilae, who assisted 
Hastings in some of his research, later wrote to me stating 
that he very much regretted having helped Hastings.
Killilae stated that much of what he told Hastings was 
twisted by that author, and taken out of context. Among 
other misrepresentations, Hastings even misspells Killilae's 
name!4
As I began my research on the Battle of the Chongchon 
River, I consulted Keith McFarland's excellent work The 
Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography. This bibliography 
contains a comprehensive listing of books, articles, 
personal memoirs, and doctoral dissertations which have as 
their subject any facet of the Korean War. Of its 
approximately 2,500 entries, there are only 3 which pertain 
specifically to the Battle of the Chongchon River.5
One of these entries is an article written by John 
Fralish entitled "Roadblock" which appeared in the now 
defunct Combat Forces Journal in 1953.6 The other two 
entries are both by S.L.A. Marshall. The first is an 
article, also published in Combat Forces Journal, entitled 
"They Fought to Save Their Guns." This article was actually 
an excerpt from Marshall's then forthcoming book The River 
and the Gauntlet, and this volume is the third and final 
entry in McFarland's list on the Battle of the Chongchon 
River.7
5Because McFarland's bibliography appeared in 198 6, I 
thoroughly searched the abstracts of articles published from 
1984 to the present on Korean, Military, and U.S. History. 
This search revealed no journal articles on the battle. 
Continuing my search for information, I contacted University 
Microfilms Incorporated (UMI), the primary source for 
obtaining copies of doctoral dissertations and master's 
theses. UMI personnel sent me a computer printout of their 
thorough search of their computer databanks which contain 
dissertations and theses going back to the turn of the 
century. Therein no dissertation or thesis was found which 
discussed the Battle of the Chongchon River.8
Two books that provide detailed coverage of the Battle 
of the Chongchon River have appeared since the publication 
of McFarland's bibliography: Roy Appleman's Disaster in 
Korea and Billy Mossman's official U.S. Army history Ebb and 
Flow.9 I found both of these books to be invaluable in the 
preparation of my thesis. Although these books cover broad 
areas of the Korean War, they nevertheless stand with S.L.A. 
Marshall's River and the Gauntlet, as the best sources for 
information on the battle.
As part of its investigation into the reasons for the 
American defeat at the Battle of the Chongchon River, the 
U.S. Army sent Brigadier General (then Colonel) S.L.A. 
Marshall to Korea in December 1950, to interview men who had
6fought in the battle. Marshall later turned these 
interviews into a book, The River and the Gauntlet, which 
was published in 1953. This volume remains today as the 
only book to devote itself entirely to the Battle of the 
Chongchon River. Since many of the U.S. Army's official 
records were destroyed in the fighting and in the subsequent 
withdrawal from North Korea, Marshall's book has stood for 
four decades as the primary source for information on the 
f ight at the Chongchon River.10
Although an invaluable source for first hand accounts 
of the fighting, Marshall's work does have its weaknesses. 
The main fault in Marshall's work is that it is not 
footnoted at all and aside from mentioning his interviews, 
Marshall does not cite any other sources for his 
information. I have read Marshall's book several times and 
have concluded from the information he presents that he did 
use at least some of the official U.S. Army records, 
although he himself does not mention this.
Marshall's work is further limited by the fact that it 
was written and published while the Korean War was still 
going on. As a result much of Marshall's information, 
especially on the Chinese army, is vague and even incorrect. 
For example only in rare instances does Marshall mention 
Chinese unit designations. When a Chinese army unit is 
mentioned by its designation, like the CCF 94th Infantry
7Regiment, the information is usually incorrect. I have made
extensive use of U.S. Army documents on the battle which
were still classified as "Secret” at the time Marshall's
book appeared and have drawn on official U.S. Army records
to document the Chinese order of battle as well.
As part of my research for this thesis, I located and
corresponded with several key figures who appear in
Marshall's book. I interviewed many of these men, and other
veterans with whom they put me in touch with, at the 7 2nd
Annual Reunion of the Second "Indianhead" Division
Association, held in Ft. Worth, Texas from July 21-25, 1993.
These men offered not only a unique perspective on the
battle but also interesting insights into Marshall's
research methods. All of these men agreed that Marshall's
book gave an accurate portrayal of the battle, and all
offered laudatory praise of Marshall. The weakness in
Marshall's interviews was the atmosphere of suspicion in
which they were conducted. As Colonel Reginald Hinton
explained to me:
We thought they [Marshall's investigation team] 
were trying to blame someone for the loss of the 
battle, and we didn't want to get anybody in 
trouble. So it's not that I lied or anything like 
that, it's just that I didn't offer any additional 
information either. I answered the questions they 
put to me with little or no comment.11
Not all of the men mentioned in Marshall's work were
actually interviewed by him. Some were placed in the book
8as part of an interview gathered from another individual.
For example Lieutenant William "Sam" Mace makes a prominent 
appearance in Marshall's chapter on the Chinese ambush along 
the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road. Mace's first name is 
erroneously given as 11 Jim1 in the book, because the unnamed 
individual who Marshall interviewed provided inaccurate 
information. Since Marshall has been relied upon as the 
primary source of information on the battle, other authors 
have quoted Marshall and compounded his mistake by also 
referring to Mace as either Jim or James.12 I personally 
interviewed Sam Mace, and his testimony on the battle 
differs from that attributed to him by Marshall's unnamed 
source. I have incorporated this new testimony into the 
thesis along with his correct name.
Roy Appleman's Disaster in Korea is a ponderously 
written work on Eighth Army's campaign in northwest Korea 
from mid-November to mid-December 1950. Appleman was the 
first U.S. Army historian of the Korean War and in this 
position authored the mammoth South to the Naktoncr. North to 
the Yalu. which is the official account of the Korean War 
from June 25th, 1950 to November 24th, 1950.13 Although 
originally scheduled to write the next volume covering the 
Battle of the Chongchon River, as well as X Corps' battle at 
the Chosin Reservoir, Appleman left the project. Many years 
later Appleman began writing again as a private citizen, and
9in rapid succession published several works on the Korean 
War, using material he had originally gathered when assigned 
to the project by the U.S. Army.
Disaster in Korea, published in 1989, is Appleman's 
book covering the Battle of the Chongchon River and it is 
superior to Marshall's work on the same subject in several 
ways. The most readily noticeable difference is that 
Appleman extensively footnotes and documents his sources for 
information. These sources are almost exclusively U.S. Army 
documents and letters that Appleman collected from senior 
officers in his capacity as the official historian of the 
battle. In its use of primary documents, Appleman's work is 
without parallel.
The weakness in Appleman's work is a lack of 
originality in his accounts of small unit actions. Despite 
a rather sharp critique of Marshall's book that Appleman 
includes in his discussion of sources, Appleman repeatedly 
lifts whole sections from Marshall's work to describe the 
fighting. This is somewhat surprising considering the 
quality of Appleman's scholarship throughout most of the 
book. As mentioned previously this thesis includes not only 
new interviews with the men in Marshall's (and Appleman's) 
book, but also new interviews with men who never spoke with 
Marshall. Consequently, the small unit actions described in 
this thesis are completely original and do not appear in any
10
other writing on the Battle of the Chongchon River.
In regard to sources of information on the Battle of
the Chongchon River Appleman makes the comment:
It is a matter of regret that some of the Engineer 
survivors (2nd Engineer Combat Battalion) did not 
leave a record or that a report was not assembled 
soon after the event and made a part of the 
official records of the 2nd Division. Such a 
record would have revealed details of this unit's 
valor below Kunu-ri in the afternoon and evening 
of 3 0 November 1950.14
This thesis includes interviews and correspondence with 
four members of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion who 
survived the Battle of the Chongchon River, and it is with a 
great sense of honor that I add their testimony to the body 
of literature on this battle.
When Appleman left the U.S. Army's historical project 
on the Korean War, the task of providing the official 
account of the Battle of the Chongchon River was delegated 
to Billy C. Mossman. Progressing in fits and starts 
Mossman's book Ebb and Flow took almost a quarter century to 
complete, finally being published in 199 0.15 Mossman's 
official history is comparable to Appleman's book in the 
sense that they both used many of the same U.S. Army 
documents as sources. Mossman's work is more general than 
Appleman's or Marshall's, as it covers the Korean War from 
November, 1950 - July, 1951. Thus only two chapters of the 
book deal with the Battle of the Chongchon River.
11
Mossman's book does a wonderful job of describing the 
Battle of the Chongchon River in the sense of its strategic 
importance to the entire United Nations command in Korea.
At the same time, because the book is written at an 
operational/strategic level, there is extremely scanty 
coverage of fighting at battalion level and lower. The few 
accounts of such actions that Mossman does provide are in 
the main drawn from Marshall's The River and the Gauntlet.
As mentioned previously, I have used my own interviews to 
provide information on tactical operations as well as 
official U.S. Army records, although I have interpreted many 
of these records differently than Mossman or 
Appleman.
There are several general histories of the Korean War 
which provide good coverage of the Battle of the Chongchon 
River. Chief among these is T.R. Fehrenbach's This Kind of 
War.16 Fehrenbach commanded a rifle company in the Second 
Infantry Division during the Korean War and his book 
provides an excellent narrative on the Battle of the 
Chongchon River. Although he relies heavily on Marshall for 
much of his information, Fehrenbach nevertheless provides 
some new data as well.
Bevin Alexander, another former U.S. Army historian of 
the campaign, gives a good (albeit brief) account of the 
battle in his provocatively titled Korea: The First War We
12
Lost.17 Clay Blair's The Forgotten War is a wonderful 
source of information on the Korean War, and he provides an 
incredible amount of biographical detail on U.S. Army 
officers down to battalion level. Blair also gives a solid 
and detailed account of the Battle of the Chongchon River, 
although he, like most others, relies almost exclusively on
S.L.A. Marshall for his information.
As the son of a machinegunner who fought at the 
Chongchon River, I grew up with the stories of gallantry, 
cowardice, brilliance and stupidity that made up this 
terrible battle. When I reached adulthood and began to 
investigate the battle from a military historian's 
perspective, I combed through archival collections reading 
lengthy war diaries, and intelligence reports. I was very 
disappointed to discover that in addition to the horrendous 
human loss suffered by the Second Division at the Chongchon 
River, many original documents had also been lost in the 
fighting. For example, the records of the Second Division's 
ordeal in the retreat from Kunu-ri on the final day of the 
battle were mere sketchy outlines composed months after the 
event. Only Marshall's The River and the Gauntlet provided 
any information at all on the ambush below Kunu-ri.
I therefore decided that the only way to form an 
accurate picture of what had happened to the Second Infantry 
Division along the banks of the Chongchon River in November
13
1950, was to seek out and interview the men who were 
actually there. I was able to find many of these men and 
interview them at great length concerning their experiences 
in the battle. I consider these interviews to be the 
greatest contribution of this thesis to the literature on 
the Battle of the Chongchon River.
Because of the heavy casualties suffered by the Second 
Infantry Division at the Chongchon River and because some 
veterans of the fight have died during the past forty-three 
years, I was extremely pleased to be able to locate so many 
survivors of the battle. Many of these men told me that 
only because my late father had fought in the battle with 
them, were they willing to speak with me about this 
extremely traumatic event in their lives.
For many of these men, including my father, this battle 
was the most horrible of all in which they fought. Several 
veterans told me about having "flashbacks" about the battle, 
and many suffered from nightmares for years afterwards. All 
this helps demonstrates how war scars the soul of a man as 
much as it scars his body.
I believe the tales of these men give a human face to 
the mere numbers of troops and casualties which historians 
often impersonally bandy about as if they were cardboard 
pieces on a game table. These men are real, and their 
stories are real. Some are heroes and others just ordinary
14
soldiers. But what they all have in common, is that they 
were combat soldiers who fought at the Battle of the 
Chongchon River. When their country called, these men 
answered, and on the killing ground of Korea they fought 
this nation's enemies with rifle, machinegun, and even bare 
fists.
The only reward these veterans seek now is that their
tale be told so that future generations of Americans might
know the price that they and other vaterans paid for the
freedom we now enjoy. Robert Hammersmith, who served with
the Second Division in the battle, told me:
I feel it's great what you're doing about this 
because like they say it's the 'Forgotten War'.
You mention it to people and they don't know what 
the hell you mean. They don't realize how many 
people got killed over there. They have no idea 
what the guys went through over there. I'm glad 
to see you do something like this because 
somebody's got to get this stuff and document it, 
and put it down to let the damn people know.18
Above all else, this thesis presents the story of these
forgotten soldiers of the "Forgotten War."
15
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CHAPTER I
WAR IN A DISTANT LAND
Leaves of autumn hurrying through the courtyard—
Last year the patter of dancing footsteps.
This year the sound of falling tears.
Deep red maples mirrored in still, deep water—
Last year the heart of a happy poet.
This year the blood of a warrior slain.
Yi Soong-in, "Autumn Song", 14th Century Korea
On November 23, 1950, Thanksgiving Day was celebrated 
by the men of the United States Second Infantry Division, 
8,000 miles from home in the heart of North Korea. The 
Second Division was part of a multi-national force deployed 
to the Korean peninsula, under the authority of the United 
Nations, to repel the invasion of South Korea by communist 
North Korea.1 The Second Division had seen heavy fighting 
during three months in Korea, but little did its men know 
that their greatest trial lay ahead. In the next week, the 
men of the Second Division would be engaged in the Battle of 
the Chongchon River, the largest and most important battle 
they had ever fought in Korea. Although Americans would 
little remember this battle, the survival of the United 
States Eighth Army in Korea came to depend in large part on 
the fighting abilities of the men of the United States 
Second Infantry Division.
The United States Second Infantry Division was 
commanded by Major General Laurence Keiser, a West Point
17
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graduate (Class of 1917) and a decorated combat veteran of 
the First World War.2 The Second Division was composed of 
the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2 3rd Infantry Regiment, and 3 8th 
Infantry Regiment. There were also artillery, tank, and 
engineer battalions attached to the Second Division, which 
brought the total strength of the division at the time of 
the Battle of the Chongchon River to approximately 15,000 
men.3
A U.S. Army infantry division in 1950 was composed of 
three infantry regiments, each with an authorized strength 
of approximately 3,700 men. These three regiments were the 
principal combat units of the division. Each regiment was 
comprised of three battalions, and each of these battalions 
contained four companies. In addition to the infantry 
regiments, there were usually four artillery battalions (of 
18 guns each) assigned to an infantry division, although 
this varied greatly during the Korean War. A tank 
battalion, and an engineer battalion were also attached to 
an infantry division, along with medical, communication, and 
transport companies.
The Second Infantry Division had been in continous 
service as a component of the U.S. Army, since the division 
was first activated in 1917. The Second Division had an 
enviable combat record in both World Wars, and was retained 
as an active unit in the wake of U.S. demobilization
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following World War II. The men serving with the Second 
Infantry Division in 1950, were volunteers drawn from all 
parts of the United States. The Second Division was 
stationed at Ft. Lewis, Washington on June 25, 1950, when 
news arrived that the communist Democratic People's Republic 
of (North) Korea had invaded the Republic of (South) Korea.4
President Harry Truman interpreted the North Korean 
attack as but another move by a pawn of the Soviet Union in 
the Soviet Unions's quest for world domination. As Republic 
of Korea (ROK) forces collapsed and the North Korean 
People's Army (NKPA) began to overrun the south, Truman 
decided the United States had to halt this aggression and 
ordered the commitment of American forces to the Korean 
peninsula. At the same time, Truman called for an emergency 
session of the United Nations Security Council and 
immediately proposed that its members commit forces to the 
struggle as well. The Security Council passed this proposal 
and established a United Nations command under General of 
the Army Douglas MacArthur who was designated as Supreme 
Commander.5
Shortly afterward, the United States Second Infantry 
Division had been alerted for overseas deployment and was 
shipped to Korea, arriving in August 1950. Within days of 
its arrival in Korea, the Second Division joined in the 
vicious struggle raging around the vital South Korean port
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of Pusan.
In fierce battles with the North Koreans along the 
Naktong River, the men of the Second Infantry Division 
received their baptism of fire. The Second Division 
performed well in these early battles, and played a major 
role in defeating the North Korean attempts to break through 
to Pusan. In one incredible week from August 31 - September 
5, 1950, seven men from the Second Infantry Division won 
their nation's highest award for bravery in battle, the 
Medal of Honor.6
On September 15, 1950, United States forces landed 
behind North Korean lines at the port of Inchon cutting NKPA 
supply routes to North Korea, and the disintegration of the 
North Korean army began. Within a matter of weeks, North 
Korean resistance in occupied South Korea had collapsed, and 
United States, ROK, and other United Nations forces were 
fighting their way northward.7
Flushed with success, President Truman and General 
MacArthur made the decision to cross into North Korea and 
win a complete victory by conquering the communist 
aggressors.8 On September 30, 1950, the ROK 3rd Division 
crossed the 38th Parallel which formed the boundary between 
North and South Korea. Within days United States and other 
United Nations forces followed, and the United Nations 
attempt to conquer North Korea had begun. Unheeded in the
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euphoria of victory, were ominous warnings that began to be 
issued by North Korea's fellow communist neighbor to the 
north, the People's Republic of China.
Communist China
Fresh from its victory over the U.S.-backed 
Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong's 
communist regime in China interpreted all American 
intentions in Asia in the worst possible light. The thought 
of a U.S.-led coalition of armed forces sweeping towards 
their border sparked fear in the Chinese. The destruction 
of a fellow communist nation in Asia could also have serious 
implications for China. If North Korea could be destroyed, 
the Chinese reasoned, then the United States might begin to 
think in terms of "rolling back" communism in Asia, and 
China would be next on its list.9
On October 2, 1950, Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai 
sent a message to the United Nations through the Indian 
ambassador to China in which Zhou warned that if any non- 
Korean forces crossed into North Korea, China would consider 
itself obliged to intervene in the war.10 Neither MacArthur 
nor the Truman administration were impressed with this 
warning, and both considered it to be a bluff. Several days 
later, the first American forces crossed into North Korea.
Over the years, many scholars have argued that if only
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South Korean Forces alone had crossed the 3 8th Parallel into 
North Korea, China would not have intervened in the war.
This argument has been destroyed by the remarkable findings 
presented by Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai in 
their book, Uncertain Partners: Stalin. Mao, and the Korean 
War. Taking advantage of the new academic freedom in the 
former Soviet Union, Goncharov and his colleagues gained 
access to previously unavailable Soviet documents, including 
a cache of messages exchanged by Mao and Soviet Premier 
Joseph Stalin just before China's entry into the Korean War.
In a telegram dated October 2, 1950, the same date that 
Zhou issued his warning and before American forces had 
entered North Korea, Mao informed Stalin that "We (Chinese) 
have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the 
name of Chinese People's Volunteers to fight the United 
States and its lackey (ROK President) Syngman Rhee and to 
aid our Korean comrades."11
Soon afterward, the Chinese began secretly deploying 
vast armies across the Yalu River into North Korea. Mao 
appointed General Peng Dehuai as commander-in-chief of the 
Chinese forces deployed to Korea. On October 14th, 1950, 
Peng told his troops why they were being sent to fight in 
Korea:
The U.S. imperialists are employing seven 
divisions and the lackey troops of Syngman Rhee in 
unbridled aggression against the Korean
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revolutionary government and people. Having 
crossed the 38th Parallel, the enemy is continuing 
to advance northward with all his might. We will 
actively support the North Korean people to oppose 
the aggressors and help them strive for 
independence, freedom, and liberation. If we do 
not dispatch troops to actively support the Korean 
revolutionary government and people, the 
reactionaries at home and abroad will be swollen 
with arrogance. We will be put under direct 
threat if U.S. imperialism should occupy all of 
Korea.12
Shortly after the capture of the North Korean capital 
of Pyongyang, elements of Lieutenant General Walton Walker's 
Eighth United States Army encountered Chinese soldiers for 
the first time near the village of Unsan, North Korea. In a 
desperate battle lasting from October 2 5th - November 6th, 
1950, a ROK division and a U.S. regiment were badly mauled 
by the Chinese. The United Nations offensive north was 
halted in its tracks, as U.S. and ROK units pulled back into 
defensive positions to counter an anticipated all-out 
assault by the Chinese. Then as suddenly as they had 
appeared, the Chinese broke contact with United Nations 
forces and faded back into the bleak hills of North Korea.13
A strange calm descended over Korea. After 
approximately two weeks of only sporadic contact by American 
and ROK forces with the Chinese, MacArthur decided that the 
initial intervention by the Chinese army had been nothing 
but a bluff. On November 24, 1950, he ordered a resumption 
of the United Nations offensive with the intention of
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pushing north to the Chinese border and bringing all of 
North Korea under United Nations control.14
Repeated American aerial reconnaissance of the area 
between the UN lines and the Chinese border revealed no 
large enemy troop concentrations.15 Ominously though,
Chinese pilots flying the most modern Soviet fighter 
aircraft, the Mig-15, began making repeated sorties from air 
bases in China against American reconnaissance flights over 
North Korea. In spite of this provocation, the Truman 
administration adhered to its policy of prohibiting U.S. 
aircraft from entering Chinese airspace to engage the enemy 
planes or to attack their bases.16
On November 9, 1950, an American RB-2 9 propeller driven 
reconnaissance plane was attacked over North Korean airspace 
near the Yalu River by two Chinese Mig-15's and was so badly 
damaged that it crashed while attempting to land at its 
airbase. After this incident, the United States Air Force 
forbade the use of the slow RB-2 9's near the Chinese border 
due to their vulnerability to attack. The U.S. Air Force, 
with only three squadrons of jet propelled reconnaissance 
aircraft in Asia, had severely limited intelligence 
gathering capacity.17
Additionally, in the days before the resumption of the 
United Nations offensive, billowing black smoke from forest 
fires covered large areas of North Korea, further hampering
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aerial reconnaissance. U.S. reconnaissance planes had 
spotted similar fires just before the battle with the 
Chinese at Unsan, and U.S. Army intelligence was gradually 
becoming aware that the Chinese set these fires in order to
mask daylight troop movements. The Chinese were drawing a
cloak of secrecy over their vast armies massing in North 
Korea.18
On November 23, 1950, MacArthur's military intelligence 
chief, Major General Charles Willoughby, estimated that 
there were between 44,000 and 70,000 Chinese soldiers in all 
of Korea, along with scattered remnants of the North Korean 
army. According to Willoughby, the Chinese and North
Koreans intended to fight a delaying action with United
Nations forces, while retreating north into China. This 
estimate of communist strength and intentions was accepted 
by both Lieutenant General Walton Walker's Eighth Army in 
Korea, as well as by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Washington, D.C.19
Although correct in its estimate of North Korean 
strength, both MacArthur's military intelligence gravely 
underestimated Chinese strength and intentions. By November 
23, 1950, approximately 3 00,000 Chinese soldiers had entered
Korea and rather than retreating, this massive force was 
preparing to launch its own offensive.20
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November 23, 1950
On November 23, 1950, the United Nations forces 
celebrated Thanksgiving Day, with what many would later 
describe as the best meal they ever had in Korea. Even 
frontline troops were served turkey with all the trimmings.
A joyous mood of optimism prevailed among all U.N. forces 
regarding their imminent attack north, and talk of victory 
parades in Tokyo and being home by Christmas flew up and 
down the grapevine. Sharing this jubilant mood were the 
officers and men of the United States Second Infantry 
Division.21
The Second Infantry Division was a component of the 
Eighth United States Army in Korea. On November 23, 1950, 
the Eighth Army was comprised of:
I Corps: U.S. 24th Infantry Division, British 27th 
Commonwealth Brigade, ROK 1st Division 
IX Corps: U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. 25th 
Infantry Division, Turkish Brigade
ROK II Corps: ROK 6th Division, ROK 7th Division,
ROK 8th Division
Eighth Army Reserve: U.S. 1st Cavalry Division,
U.S. 187th Airborne Regiment, British 2 9th 
Brigade, Filipino Battalion, Thai Battalion.22 
Walker's plan of attack called for all three corps to 
advance abreast of one another with I Corps in the west, IX
27
Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps in the east. The 
Eighth Army reserve would follow behind the advancing corps 
and be prepared to either exploit any sudden enemy collapse, 
or reinforce a threatened sector of the line, as events 
warranted.23
Further to the east of Eighth Army, across the rugged 
Myomyang Mountain range, the U.S. X*Corps was deployed in 
northeastern Korea. Because U.N. forces lacked the manpower 
to establish a solid frontline across the Korean peninsula, 
Eighth Army and X Corps would be fighting their own 
individual battles out of touch with one another.24
Communist opposition to the U.N. offensive seemed to be 
a remote possibility because no Chinese had been encountered 
in over two weeks, and no United Nations unit had engaged a 
North Korean force larger than a regiment since October. 
Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker 
perceived the main obstacles to his advance to be the rugged 
hills and steep valleys, which made overland marching 
through North Korea an extremely arduous task. In addition, 
the broken terrain made radio communication between units 
extremely difficult and made physical contact virtually 
impossible.25
November 24, 1950
On November 24, 1950, General of the Army Douglas
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MacArthur issued the following communique from his
headquarters in Tokyo, Japan:
The United Nations massive compression envelopment 
in North Korea against the new Red armies 
operating there is now approaching its decisive 
effort. This morning the western sector of the 
pincer [Eighth Army] moves forward in general 
assault in an effort to complete the compression 
and close the vise. If successful this should for 
all practical purposes end the war, restore peace 
and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal 
of United Nations military forces, and permit the 
complete assumption by the Korean people and 
nation of full sovereignty and international 
equality. It is that for which we fight.26
With those words, the great United Nations offensive to end
the war in Korea began.
As part of the Eighth Army's advance in northwestern
Korea, the United States Second Infantry Division moved
north on November 24 with its regiments in an inverted
pyramid battle formation: the 9th Infantry Regiment on the
west, the 3 8th Infantry Regiment on the east, and the 2 3rd
Infantry Regiment and division artillery to the south. This
great offensive punch by the Second Infantry Division
encountered only the expected sporadic skirmishing by small
retreating enemy units.27
After making solid advances against little to no
resistance on November 24th, the U.N. offensive resumed at
dawn on November 25th. Eighth Army units in the west again
made excellent progress, encountering virtually no
opposition. Although to the east of the Second Infantry
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Division, Major General Yu Hae Ueng reported to Eighth Army 
Headquarters that his ROK II Corps was encountering heavy 
enemy resistance.28 These reports from the South Koreans 
were not taken seriously by Eighth Army Headquarters. With 
some justification, the U. S. Army had a low regard for the 
abilities of the South Korean soldiers. What the 
undertrained and underequipped ROK's regarded as "heavy 
resistance" could be the same amount that United States 
troops regarded as "light."
The Second Infantry Division also ran into a sharp 
fight on November 25th at its northernmost point of advance, 
Hill 219 which lay alongside the main road leading north 
through the valley of the Chongchon River. In a fight which 
lasted all day on November 25th, Company B of the 9th 
Infantry Regiment was able to secure only part of the hill 
against determined resistance by enemy troops positively 
identified as being Chinese.29 Despite this engagement, 
Second Division Headquarters seems to have been no more 
alarmed by developments than Eighth Army was.30
As the frigid darkness of an autumn night fell across 
the rugged hills of North Korea on November 25th, 1950, the 
temperature dropped to 2 0 degrees fahrenheit. The icy winds 
blowing out of the sub-arctic wastes of Manchuria made it 
feel much colder.31 The men of the Second Infantry Division 
shivered as they lay on the open ground, but still, most
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kept their optimism. The delay at Hill 219 was only 
temporary, many of the men thought, and soon this whole 
damned business would be over.
But what if the Chinese had not retreated like 
MacArthur was telling them? What if the Chinese were still 
there, watching and waiting for the moment to strike? If 
that were true then there would be Hell to pay for the over­
optimism of MacArthur, the political miscalculations of 
Truman, and the soldiers own lack of caution. Indeed there 
would be Hell to pay. And on the night of November 25,
1950, the blare of Chinese bugles announced that Hell had 
come to collect.
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CHAPTER II
NIGHT OF THE DRAGON 
"Let your plans be as dark and impenetrable as night 
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt." 
Sun Tze, The Art of War
Shortly after dark, on the evening of November 25,
1950, the 30,000 Chinese soldiers of General Han Kuang-chu's 
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 40th Army emerged from their 
hiding places in the caves, mineshafts, and villages of the 
North Korean countryside. The CCF 40th Army was considered 
by Chinese military leaders to be the finest unit in their 
army, and as such it was chosen to lead the Chinese Second 
Phase Offensive in the west. The target of Han's assault 
was the United States Second Infantry Division, then 
deployed opposite his 40th Army, along the valley of the 
Chongchon River.1
The men of Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry 
Regiment, Second Infantry Division held a small hill astride 
the main axis of the CCF 40th Army's attack. Expecting to 
renew their own offensive north the following morning, 
"Charlie" Company had not dug defensive positions but rather 
took advantage of whatever natural cover was available. On 
the far right of the company, PFC Robert B. Bruce aided his 
gun crew in setting up their .30-caliber machinegun in a
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small depression near the top of the hill. It provided 
little cover, but was better than nothing at all. Since 
Bruce and his crew did not plan on staying in the position 
long, they were not too concerned about the lack of 
defensive preparations.2
Approximately one hundred yards to Bruce's left, 
Corporal Alvin G. Moore helped his squad set up their .3 0- 
caliber machinegun. Moore wasn't concerned about an enemy 
attack that night either, as he was more worried about 
staying warm.3 Icy winds howled through the valleys of 
North Korea, and swirled about the hilltop position of 
Charlie Company, cutting right through the summer uniforms 
that the men had been wearing since arriving in Korea in 
August. Pile caps were the one item of winter clothing that 
had been universally issued to the frontline troops. Other 
cold weather gear was still being distributed at the time of 
the attack north, and many units had yet to receive their 
issue.4
All was quiet when, from out of the frigid night, the 
blare of Chinese bugles startled the men of Company C.
Almost simultaneously mortar fire began to land on their 
positions. Men scrambled from sleeping bags and struggled 
to put on their boots, tripping over each other in the 
darkness. Bruce was already awake, as he had been on watch 
when the Chinese attack began. Bruce quickly threw back the
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bolt on his .30-caliber machinegun, locking and loading the 
weapon, his eyes searching for enemy movement in the moonlit 
darkness.5
Suddenly, Chinese soldiers leapt up no more than 3 0 
yards from Bruce's gun position, and using their peculiar 
underhand sidearm throw, hurled a volley of grenades at him. 
Bruce opened fire with his machinegun while the grenades 
were still in midair, cutting down several of the Chinese 
grenadiers before they regained cover. The grenades 
themselves fell short of Bruce's position, and exploded 
harmlessly on the frozen earth. In this battle, and in the 
coming battles in Korea, Chinese soldiers would prove to be 
notoriously weak-armed grenade throwers.6
Behind the Chinese grenadier skirmishers, Bruce could 
see the main Chinese assault force moving up the hill at him 
in large waves of men, firing their rifles and sub- 
machineguns as they came. The staccato bursts of the 
enemy's small arms fire added their lethality to the ghastly 
orchestra of battle, whose sounds filled the frozen night 
air on Charlie Company's hill. Bruce swung his .30-caliber 
machinegun in a wide arc, bringing the attacking Chinese 
under fire, and killing or wounding dozens of them. But the 
holes in the Chinese lines were rapidly filled, as the 
seemingly endless lines of enemy soldiers continued to close 
on Bruce's position.7
38
On the left flank of Charlie Company, Alvin Moore was 
also firing on the Chinese infantry with his .30-caliber 
machinegun. Moore recalled inflicting heavy casualties on 
the Chinese infantry. But onward the Chinese came, running 
full speed, hurling grenades, and firing their deadly sub- 
machineguns. The Chinese assault wave swept right over 
Moore's gun position, as the enemy soldiers went running 
past him on either side.8
In daylight, American airstrikes could have wreaked 
havoc on the dense Chinese formations. But the Chinese 
attack along the Chongchon River, as all their offensives in 
the Korean War, came at night. In 1950 few American 
aircraft were capable of flying close support missions at 
night, because of their inability to identify and 
distinguish between enemy and friendly forces in the 
darkness.
The Second Infantry Division had six battalions of 
artillery attached to it, and one of these, the 3 7th Field 
Artillery, began to provide supporting fire to the 9th 
Infantry Regiment.9 Like close air support, the artillery 
could only be directed against Chinese targets not in close 
proximity to friendly forces, for fear of hitting their own 
men. The Chinese were well aware of the limitations that 
night operations and close combat placed on American forces, 
and had tactics designed to exploit these weaknesses to the
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utmost. The commander-in-chief of the Chinese forces in
Korea, Peng Dehuai, told his men on the eve of their entry
into the Korean War:
Our resolute and brave tactical operations consist 
in having the courage to fight close combat using 
dynamite, fighting the enemy with bayonets, and 
throwing hand grenades. The enemy is afraid of 
such operations.10
Deprived of its air support, and unable to use its 
supporting artillery effectively, the U.S. 9th Infantry 
Regiment was forced to engage an enemy force of overwhelming 
numerical superiority in a "straight-up" infantry fight.
The outcome was almost a foregone conclusion.
As the Chinese assault waves swept over Company C's 
position, they began to regroup on the other side of the 
hill in an attempt to surround the Americans. Corporal 
Alvin Moore recalled: "The Chinese began yelling at us in 
English; 'What's the matter GI?', 'You no like me GI?', We 
kill you tonight GI', and other things of that nature."11 
Though several men that were in Moore's squad had "bugged 
out" and ran, Moore stayed at his post firing his weapon 
until "the barrel glowed red" in the darkness.12 Finally 
Moore ran out of ammunition. At almost the same time he 
heard an explosion, and the machinegun on his right 
(probably Bruce's gun) ceased firing. Out of ammo, and 
realizing his position was no longer tenable, Moore disabled 
his machinegun so as to render it useless to the Chinese.
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Then, along with the other two remaining members of his 
squad, Moore began to move down the back side of the hill.13
Meanwhile on Charlie Company's right flank, Bruce's 
machinegun position had also been flanked. Small arms fire 
was raking the small depression in the ground that served as 
cover for Bruce and his crew, and they began taking 
casualties. The man serving as Bruce's loader was killed, 
and then another man was cut down as he tried to replace the 
loader. Realizing that the Chinese had his position 
surrounded, Bruce began to think that this might be the end 
of the line. Fully aware of how North Korean's had tortured 
and killed American prisoners, and with no reason to assume 
the Chinese would be any different, Bruce made up his mind 
to go down fighting, rather than surrender.14 Having to 
serve as his own loader, Bruce reached across the shallow 
depression to drag over another box of ammunition for his 
machinegun. As his hand groped through the darkness for the 
ammo box, he suddenly felt an enemy hand grenade laying on 
the ground. He had never seen it come in. Instinctively, 
Bruce grasped the deadly missile, and in one motion hurled 
it skyward while bringing his hands over his face. The 
grenade detonated in mid-air. Bruce remembered a red flash, 
and then everything went black.15
In a matter of minutes Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th 
Infantry Regiment had been overrun and destroyed. Elsewhere
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the rest of the 1st Battalion was being hit hard, as well as 
the 3rd Battalion. Incredibly, the 2nd Battalion of the 9th 
Regiment was not engaged in battle on the night of November 
25th.16 Even as its sister battalions were being destroyed, 
the 2nd Battalion was hardly aware there was even a battle 
going on. The rugged terrain of Korea so channeled the 
sounds of battle through the valleys that the Chinese were 
able to attack individual U.S. companies and battalions, 
without being detected by nearby U.S. units.
In addition, the Chinese displayed an incredible 
ability to infiltrate American positions and attack 
vulnerable rear areas, especially headquarters. Attacking 
American headquarters units became a favorite and effective 
tactic of the Chinese in the Battle of the Chongchon River. 
Everything a frontline American infantry company needed in 
the way of artillery or air support, or reinforcements, had 
to be requested through battalion and regimental 
headquarters. If the lines of communication between the 
headquarters and the frontline units could be cut, either by 
destroying the headquarters, forcing it to displace, or 
keeping it so busy defending itself that it could not 
function properly, then the frontline companies would be 
isolated from any support and could be chopped up piece­
meal.
Serving as a jeep driver with Headquarters Company, 1st
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Battalion, 9th Infantry was PFC James D. Moran, an 18 year-
old volunteer from Omaha, Nebraska. Moran was asleep with
the other men in his company, on the floor of a small hut in
a tiny Korean village where 1st Battalion of the 9th had
established its headquarters. Around 2200 hours, Moore and
his men were jolted awake by the sound of automatic weapons
fire in the headquarters compound. Hurriedly dressing and
grabbing their rifles, Moran and the rest of his company
spilled out into the compound. Moran headed for his jeep to
await his Captain, not realizing that virtually everyone
else in the headquarters, had gone to a low stone wall on
the east side of the village. Suddenly, Moran found himself
in a one-on-one firefight. Recalled Moran:
An enemy soldier, in civilian clothes, opened fire 
from the rear on me with a "burp gun", very 
inaccurate weapon, automatic fire. I dove behind 
[a] haystack and he was still shooting at me into 
it. I crawled to the other side. He had backed 
into the moonlight shadow, but was still firing.
I sighted just below the muzzle flash, and fired, 
presumably killing him as he ceased firing. As it 
was then quiet, I ran to the wall where the others 
were.17
The man Moran killed could have been either a North 
Korean guerilla thousands of whom operated in the Eighth 
Army's rear, or a Chinese infiltrator who had slipped past 
friendly lines in order to attack the battalion 
headquarters.18 Regardless of the man's actual identity he 
and the other men in his group succeeded in severely
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disrupting 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry's headquarters, and 
ensuring that its infantry companies would be without 
support during the Chinese assault.
Moran soon joined up with the rest of battalion 
headquarters behind the stone wall. By this time, enemy 
forces were swarming over the compound and even the wall was 
no longer a safe place. An unknown officer gave the order 
"Everyone up this hill!". There were two hills there, 
however, and so half the little force went up one hill, and 
half went up the other. Moran's best friend "Rickey" called 
out to him as he was half-way up one of the hills, "No Jim! 
Up this hill!" But Moran was almost to the top of his hill, 
and Chinese soldiers had poured into the gap between them.
It was the last time Moran saw his friend.19
The Chinese in the valley below assaulted the hill that 
Moran's friend and others had gone up. The moon came out 
from behind the clouds, illuminating the battlefield, and 
Moran's little band of men watched in horror as the Chinese 
massacred his friend's group on the other hill. Moran and 
the others then braced for the expected Chinese attack on 
their position, but it never came. When the battlefield 
finally quieted shortly before dawn, Moran's group slipped 
off their hill and headed south, reaching friendly lines a 
few hours later.20
Elsewhere, the survivors of Charlie Company, 1st
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Battalion were also trying to make their escape. Corporal 
Alvin Moore had reached the back of his hill, along with the 
two remaining members of his squad, expecting to find the 
rest of Company C reforming there. Instead, Moore found 
only seven other men, including his company commander. With 
Chinese soldiers swarming everywhere, Moore's group found a 
small gully which they climbed down into and began to move 
south along. As Moore's group worked their way through the 
gully, Chinese soldiers above them were at times as close as 
10-15 feet away. But staying low, and staying quiet,
Moore's men avoided them. Rounding a turn in the gully, 
Moore and his men stumbled into a group of Korean laborers. 
The U.S. Army used Korean civilians to carry food and 
ammunition to frontline units on hilltops (such as Charlie 
company's position) which supply trucks could not reach. It 
was just such a labor party that Moore's group had stumbled 
into.21
Luckily for the Koreans, Moore's men did not shoot for
fear of attracting the Chinese still all around them. As
Moore's men prepared to attack the South Koreans with
clubbed rifles and knives, the Korean laborers threw up
their hands, and frantically tried to communicate in broken
English who they were. Moore remembered that:
We thought they were Chinese or North Koreans, so 
we searched them down and all they had on them 
were some rations and some five gallon cans of
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water. One of them could speak fairly good 
English, and we told them [through this 
interpreter] that we were being overrun. So they 
told us how to get out of there, and so we 
followed them on out, and they left us later on.
And so we came upon the [Chongchon] river [and] it 
was real, real cold. I don't know how cold it 
was, but it was down below zero, but it was a 
running river, it wasn't frozen. The water was 
running real swift so it didn't freeze solid. And 
so we started wading across it, and at no time did 
I get to water above my shoulders. I managed to 
walk all the way across this river [and when] we 
got on the other side, a massive retreat had 
already started.22
Meanwhile, back at Charlie Company's original position, 
PFC Robert Bruce came back to consciousness. It was still 
dark, but Bruce had no idea how long he had been out. His 
head throbbed with pain, and as he raised his hands, he saw 
that the backs of them had been shredded by grenade 
fragments. Laying next to him were the dead bodies of the 
other men in his machinegun squad. Not sure if the Chinese 
were still nearby or not, Bruce quietly groped around his 
position looking for his Ml carbine, but it was gone, as 
were the rifles of the dead men around him. The holster for 
his .45-caliber automatic pistol was also empty. Obviously 
the Chinese had stripped the bodies of their weapons and had 
mistaken Bruce, covered in his own and the others blood, for 
dead. The only weapons Bruce had left were his hunting 
knife and two hand grenades, which were clipped to his web 
gear.23
Using his first aid pack, Bruce bandaged his hands as
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best he could, then quietly began to crawl down the hill. 
Reaching the base of the hill, Bruce still saw no sign of 
the Chinese until he reached a small trail about a hundred 
yards away from his original position. As he stood beside 
the trail trying to determine which was the best way to go 
to try and reach friendly lines, he heard oriental voices. 
Bruce quickly dove behind a small group of bushes alongside 
the trail.24
Laying prone on the ground, Bruce looked out from 
behind his scanty cover at the moonlit trail. A column of 
Chinese soldiers were jogging up the trail towards him from 
the south. Suddenly he detected more voices, this time 
coming from the north. Turning his head, he saw another 
Chinese column, this one trotting south down the trail 
towards his position. Realizing £hat the tiny bushes he was 
hiding behind would not conceal him from the Chinese once 
they got close, Bruce determined to make a run for it.25
Calmly pulling the pins on his two grenades, Bruce 
waited till the Chinese were within range, and then hurled 
one at each column. When the grenades exploded Bruce broke 
cover, ran across the trail and down a long, sloping, brush 
covered embankment on the other side. Hoarse shouts and 
high-pitched screams of agony from the Chinese were soon 
followed by an eruption of small arms fire as they sought to 
kill their ambusher. Bruce ran as fast as he could, with
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bullets whipping through the chill night air around him, 
clipping nearby bushes and tree limbs. The Chinese soon 
directed their fire in another direction, and Bruce realized 
that they had not seen him, but rather were firing blindly. 
Soon he had put plenty of distance between himself and the 
Chinese patrols.26
As Bruce walked on through the night, he stumbled and 
fell into a small creek bed. Cursing and regaining his 
balance at the bottom, Bruce suddenly sensed someone near 
him. Spinning quickly around, Bruce saw a figure crouched 
at the side of the embankment. Bruce whipped out his large 
hunting knife and leaped on the figure, driving the blade 
deep into the man's chest. To his horror, Bruce suddenly 
recognized that the man was an American soldier. Then 
realizing that the man had not cried out when he stabbed 
him, Bruce felt the body. It was cold and stiff. Examining 
him closer, Bruce saw that there was a small hole in the 
man's forehead, and that the back of his skull had been 
blown off.27
Recoiling in fright and disgust, Bruce scrambled out of 
the gully, and continued on his way. With Chinese patrols 
all around, Bruce soon determined that the only way out was 
to cross the Chongchon River. Quietly wading through icy 
water that reached up to his neck at times, Bruce finally 
reached the 9th Regiment's 2nd Battalion position and was
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immediately taken to an aid station.28
Many veterans of the 9th Infantry Regiment stated to me 
that they remember wading across the Chongchon River 
countless times during the battle, either retreating from 
the Chinese at night, or counterattacking them during the 
day. One can only imagine the sort of physical trauma 
endured by these men who waded through shoulder high water, 
in temperatures averaging 20 degrees, chunks of ice rushing 
by them, with only the swift current of the river keeping it 
from freezing solid. Finally they would emerge on the 
opposite bank, clothes freezing into blocks of ice on their 
bodies before they could walk a hundred paces. The lucky 
ones found warming tents and changes of clothing, the 
unlucky ones suffered frostbite losing toes, feet, or legs, 
and some even froze to death. This physical hardship added 
to the normal rigors of war to make the Battle of the 
Chongchon River one of the most miserable that the United 
States Army has ever fought.
Bruce and Moore had been forced to wade to the west 
bank of the Chongchon River, because the CCF 4 0th Army's 
attack had ruptured the center of the Second Infantry 
Division's lines, and allowed the Chinese to make a serious 
penetration into the division rear area. As the Chinese 
swept over the 9th Regiment, they headed straight down the 
valley of the Chongchon River, attempting to assault the two
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battalions of the Second Division's artillery that were in 
forward firing positions near the village of Kujang-dong. 
Unknown to the Chinese, however, the 1st Battalion of the 
Second Division's reserve regiment, the 23rd Infantry, had 
moved into Kujang-dong shortly before nightfall.29
Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment had been 
in division reserve during the advance on November 25th.
The stiffening enemy resistance encountered by the 9th 
Regiment led General Keiser to order the 23rd Regiment to 
move forward and assist the 9th Regiment when the advance 
was renewed at dawn on November 2 6th.
Captain Sherman W. Pratt was in command of Company B,
2 3rd Infantry Regiment, when it settled into its new 
positions near Kujang-dong shortly before nightfall on 
November 25th. To the front of "Baker” Company were the 
61st and 99th Field Artillery Battalions.30 In the 2 3rd 
Regiment, everyone's mind was on the news of the resistance 
encountered by the 9th Regiment at Hill 219. Just how 
serious were the Chinese about stopping the United Nations 
advance to the Yalu? In his memoirs, Pratt recalled that 
his commanding officer Colonel Freeman was very concerned 
about the overall situation in North Korea at that moment.
"I don't like it at all" said Freeman to Pratt. "Last thing 
I think should happen to us, is to lock horns with any 
Chinese in this remote area, far forward of our supply
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sources, and so close to theirs.*'31
At approximately 182 0 hours on the night of November 
25th, a force of Chinese estimated at 1200 men, waded the 
icy waters of the Chongchon River and attacked the 61st 
Field Artillery Battalion's position.32
The timing of this attack is important. It occurred 
approximately two hours prior to the general assault against 
the Second Infantry Division, and was thus apparently 
designed to deprive the division's infantry of their 
artillery support when the main Chinese assault hit.
In this respect, the Chinese were successful. Forced 
to fight for their guns, the 61st Field Artillery was in no 
position to offer fire support to any sector of the division 
front. The Chinese were apparently surprised by the 
presence of Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment, as many of 
them were not carrying small arms, but rather were armed 
only with demolition charges with which to blow up the 
artillery pieces. Military historian S.L.A. Marshall has 
theorized that Chinese scouts had observed the artillery 
moving into position early in the day, and then left to 
report this information, thus missing the arrival of 
Freeman's 2 3rd Regiment late that afternoon.33
As hundreds of Chinese spilled into their positions, 
the 61st Field Artillery fought back with small arms, fists, 
and clubbed rifles. After approximately an hour of intense
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battle, all of the officers of Battery A, 61st Field
Artillery were either killed or wounded. At that point,
Battery A broke and fled, abandoning guns and equipment.
This panic spread to the rest of the 61st, and soon the
entire battalion was retreating in disorder back into the
2 3rd Infantry Regiment's lines. As the Chinese attempted to
follow up on their success and pursue the retreating
artillerymen, they ran into the riflemen of the 1st
Battalion of the 23rd.34
As firing broke out across the 1st Battalion's front,
Captain Pratt moved through the darkness in order to try and
discern what the situation was. Finding the position of
Company A, Pratt interrogated a young lieutenant in command
of a rifle platoon:
'Lieutenant, I'm Baker Company CO [Commanding 
Officer]. Can You tell me what is going on?'
'We've got gooks out the anus [replied the 
lieutenant]. They are everywhere. They've been 
pouring into our area since dark. We've been 
mowing them down, and still they come. They seem 
to be pouring across the Chongchon River to our 
left flank.' 'But there are companies over there 
from the 9th Regiment' [replied Pratt] 'Are?' the 
lieutenant said. 'Better say were! Gangs of GI 
stragglers have been pouring into our positions 
all evening. The stragglers are thoroughly shook 
up, most are wet from wading the river and almost 
frozen. They say their whole outfit has been 
overrun. '35
The 23rd Infantry Regiment held against the onrushing 
enemy, and soon the snowy fields in front of them were piled 
high with Chinese corpses. Later the next day, 410 Chinese
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bodies were counted in front of the 1st Battalion, 2 3rd
Infantry Regiment's line.36 Lacking the strength to break
the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the survivors of the Chinese 
infiltration group retreated to the top of Hill 329. Here
they were joined by elements of the CCF 40th Army that had
smashed the 9th Regiment's 1st Battalion, and together these 
groups became an independent force operating in the rear of 
the Second Infantry Division. Hill 329 would go down in 
Second Infantry Division history as "Chinaman's Hat", so 
named for its resemblance to the hat of a Chinese "coolie", 
and in reference to who would own it for the remainder of 
the battle.37
As the Chinese blows rained down on the Second Infantry 
Division, they eventually worked their way to the east, 
where Colonel George Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment was 
deployed in mountainous terrain on the right flank of the 
division. Making the 38th's position even more awkward, was 
the fact that their supply route was an east-west road that 
ran laterally behind their front to division supply route on 
the main north-south road. If the regiment were suddenly 
forced to withdraw, they would have to first move several 
miles west, before they could move south. This fact was not 
lost on the Chinese, as they opened their assault on the 
3 8th Infantry Regiment shortly before midnight on November 
2 5 th.38
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Commanding the Tank Company of the 38th Infantry 
Regiment, composed of M4A3E8 Sherman tanks, was Captain 
Reginald J. Hinton. Attaching a tank company to an infantry 
regiment, was a new concept in infantry tactics. As Hinton 
explained:
You see, the way you deploy your regimental tank 
company is you put [the tanks] in direct support 
of the [infantry] battalions. And your control 
was limited to your getting your butt around there 
in a jeep and finding out what they're doing.
That's why I rode around in a jeep, instead of 
assigning myself to one of the tanks.39
Unlike most others, Hinton and his tankers were a bit
more skeptical about the "Home By Christmas" talk. Sergeant
First Class James Grigsby was one such tanker. Grigsby's
Sherman tank was deployed just outside the small North
Korean village of Somindong on the night of November 25,
1950. Stated Grigsby:
Somehow I had a hunch that the stuff would hit the 
wind machine, so I said out of a clear sky: 'Two 
men on guard in the turret tonight.' Oh, the 
bitching! (But) I says 'Them guys (Chinese) 
didn't go home. They didn't knock off when it was 
five o'clock. So two men in the turret.'40
Captain Hinton also was on edge that night and, rather
than going to sleep, stayed up late reading a book in his
tent. With the bitter cold outside, Hinton was concerned
about keeping his tank crews warm, and so set up a system of
rotating the crews back to his tent to warm up a little bit
by the small stove he had set up in there. Shortly before
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midnight, Hinton received a call on the radio from 2nd Lt. 
William "Sam" Mace, one of his tank platoon commanders who 
was supporting the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment.41 
Mace said that the 3rd Battalion was coming under heavy 
fire, and that enemy troops were trying to rush his 
position. Hinton raced out of his tent into the cold night 
air, and soon heard the sounds of battle all around him, 
"bugles blowing all over the damn place."42
In Mace's tank platoon, was Sergeant J.D. Elliott who 
was an assistant driver in one of the platoon's Shermans.
In combat, the assistant driver's job in a Sherman tank was 
to fire the .30-caliber machinegun mounted in the right 
front hull of the tank. Elliott's tank was deployed about a 
1000 yards down the road from Grigsby's tank, across from a 
small embankment which sloped down to a narrow stream about 
10-15 feet wide. The Chinese attack on the 3rd Battalion 
began shortly before midnight, and Elliott's tank was soon 
in the thick of the battle. Fighting from an open hatch, so 
as to see better to fire his .30-caliber machinegun, Elliott 
was wounded by a burst of fire from an enemy machinegun.43
The enemy bullets struck the turret behind Elliott's 
head, and ricocheted into his shoulder and back. Elliott 
slumped back inside the tank, severely wounded. While lying 
on the floor of the tank Elliott saw a blinding flash, as a 
bazooka rocket slammed into the Sherman on the opposite side
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of the tank from where he lay wounded. The rocket tore 
through the front of the tank, and exploded inside. The 
entire crew of the tank were wounded by shrapnel, some 
severely, and the Sherman began to burn.44 Elliott's 
platoon commander 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace, who observed the 
attack on Elliott's Sherman from a short distance away, 
determined that the Chinese had crossed the small stream in 
front of Elliott and were on the lip of the embankment when 
they put the bazooka round into the tank.45
The bazooka, as most weapons of the CCF at this stage 
of the Korean War, was not of Chinese manufacture. The 
Chinese Communist Forces in the Korean War were armed with a 
menagerie of small arms, machineguns, and heavy weapons 
which they had acquired from various sources over their 
years of fighting the Chinese Nationalists, the Japanese 
and, most recently, U.S. and South Korean forces. The 
bazooka that was used against Elliott's tank was in all 
likelihood a U.S. 3.5-inch bazooka, captured during the 
early skirmishes between U.S./ROK and Chinese forces in late 
October- early November 1950.46
Just a short distance away 2nd Lieutenant Sam Mace was 
in the turret of his Sherman tank, and was also fighting 
from an open hatch, so as to use his turret mounted .50- 
caliber machinegun against the onrushing waves of Chinese. 
Upon arriving in Korea, Mace had the .50-caliber machinegun
56
mount on his Sherman modified by Second Division engineers. 
Originally designed as an anti-aircraft system for the 
Sherman, the .50-caliber was set up to be fired by a person 
standing on the back of the tank. Mace's modification 
allowed him to stand in the hatch of his tank and fire the 
weapon himself. In earlier battles with the North Koreans, 
and now against the Chinese, Mace's modification served him 
well, as he inflicted heavy damage on the attacking enemy.47
The M4A3E8 Sherman, though a World War Two era design 
and in the process of being phased out as the Korean War 
began, was a formidable weapon system to employ against 
Chinese infantry. Its 76-mm cannon, one .50-caliber 
machinegun, and two .3 0-caliber machineguns could bring a 
tremendous amount of firepower to bear on an enemy target. 
The Sherman's armor stopped any small arms fire or artillery 
fragments, and it would take a direct hit from a large anti­
tank gun or a hit from an American bazooka in enemy hands to 
destroy the tank. Lacking heavy weapons, the Chinese 
infantry resorted to close infantry assaults on the tanks in 
an effort to destroy them.
On several occasions during the Battle of the Chongchon 
River, Chinese infantry literally swarmed American tanks, 
and destroyed them by tossing grenade bundles down one of 
the hatches, or by placing an explosive charge underneath 
the tank, and blowing one of its treads off, thus rendering
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the tank immobile.48 Rushing a Sherman tank would seem to
be nearly impossible but the tank had its weaknesses,
especially at night. Sam Mace recalled:
At night you have no defense in a tank. Once you 
start shooting, because you always have tracers49, 
you can't see anything. You have to wait till 
things die down before your night vision will come 
back. It's not like today. I'd have given my 
left arm for a night scope. And buckshot! We had 
no canister rounds at all. I would have loved to 
have had canister. Because we had to shoot HE 
[high explosive] at them, and that's not very 
effective. I mean you can only get, depending on 
how crowded they are, 4-5 or 6-8 people at one 
time with an HE round. That doesn't do the job.
You need something that will get out there about 
50 yards and start spreading.
Fortunately for Mace, the Chinese bazooka team either 
had only one round of ammunition for their weapon, or were 
killed by the intense machinegun and small arms fire, as 
they did not employ their weapon again that night. However, 
the Chinese did try another weapon against Mace's tank. A 
Chinese soldier crawled up out of the same creek bed the 
bazooka team had came from, and started towards Mace's tank 
carrying a bundle in his arms. Mace spotted him right away 
though, and killed him with the .50 caliber machinegun.
Later inspection of the dead Chinese soldier revealed that 
his bundle was a satchel charge of TNT.51
Sergeant Elliott and the other wounded survivors of his 
tank crew began limping down the road toward the battalion 
aid station. All around the little group, the battle still
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raged, and Elliott noticed many soldiers standing no more 
than forty feet away from them. "They weren't GI's, not of 
our faith anyway. We could have been taken prisoner very 
easily." But because everyone in Elliott's band was both 
wounded and unarmed, the Chinese made no effort to molest 
them. One of Elliott's group, becoming panicky as they 
moved past the Chinese, started to pick up a weapon from a 
dead soldier lying on the road. The others stopped him, 
however, and the wounded Americans walked right past the 
Chinese. These Chinese "had already exhausted themselves," 
said Elliott, "One of them had a rifle hanging down in front 
of his legs; he was standing just staring."52
As dawn broke across the icy valley of the Chongchon 
River on November 2 6th, 1950, the main force of the CCF 40th 
Army broke contact with the Second Infantry Division, and 
faded back into the snow covered hills. But hundreds of 
Chinese infiltrators continued to move south, in an effort 
to disrupt the Second Infantry Division's lines and 
establish roadblocks on main U.S. supply roads.
On the morning of November 2 6th, Eighth Army 
headquarters did not fully appreciate just what had happened 
to the Second Infantry Division on the night of November 
25th. EUSAK G-2's summary of enemy operations for the 
previous night described the Second Division's death grapple 
with the CCF 40th Army with the phrase: "a series of attacks
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by enemy of unknown strength made limited gains on the right 
flank.'*53 EUSAK G-2 had grounds for this estimate of the 
situation. With the exception of limited enemy attacks 
against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division on the Second 
Division's left, other Eighth Army units were encountering 
only the expected token resistance from retreating North 
Korean and Chinese forces. EUSAK G-2 therefore decided that 
the Second Infantry Division's battle was an isolated 
incident, and that the ROK II Corps was also facing only 
token enemy resistance. Concluding its summary of the 
developing battle, EUSAK G-2 gave its estimate of the 
enemy's probable course of action as: "to conduct an active 
defense in depth along present lines employing strong local 
counterattack.1,54
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CHAPTER III
THE FOG OF BATTLE
"A general should say to himself many times a day:
If the hostile army were to make its appearance in 
front, on my right, or on my left, what should I do?
And if he is embarrassed, his arrangements are bad; 
there is something wrong; he must rectify his mistake."
Napoleon, Military Maxims of Napoleon
As dawn arrived on November 26, 1950, the commanding 
general of the U.S. Second Infantry Division, Major General 
Laurence Keiser, did not share EUSAK G-2's optimistic 
estimate of enemy strength and intentions. His division had 
been struck across its entire front by a strong enemy force 
unequivocally identified as Chinese.1
On the Second Division's left flank Colonel Charles 
Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had been attacked by the 
entire CCF 12 0th Division. The 9th Infantry had suffered 
staggering losses in the fight, been driven back 3 000 yards, 
and was still under heavy Chinese pressure as daylight came 
on November 2 6th.2
The timely arrival of Colonel Paul Freeman's 2 3rd 
Infantry Regiment had saved the Second Division's artillery 
park and had the hole in the division's center caused by the 
destruction of the 9th Regiment's 1st Battalion. On the 
right flank Colonel George Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment
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had been hit hard by elements of the CCF 118th & 119th 
Divisions, but had still managed to hold its ground.3
Exactly how many Chinese struck the Second Infantry 
Division on the night of November 25th is a matter of much 
debate. Initial estimates by the Second Infantry Division's 
G-2 intelligence section made on November 2 6th 1950, placed 
enemy strength at one CCF regiment attacking the 9th, and 
two CCF regiments hitting the 2 3rd and 3 8th regiments; a 
total of one Chinese division.4 This estimate has for many 
years been accepted as providing a fairly accurate 
indication of the strength of Chinese forces during their 
opening attacks against the U.S. Second Infantry Division 
and has been cited in virtually every reference to the 
battle in secondary works on the Korean War.5
But each of the three thoroughly detailed studies of 
the Battle of the Chongchon River differs in its estimate 
of the numbers of Chinese troops who initiated the first 
assaults against the Second Infantry Division. In his book 
The River and the Gauntlet, historian and military analyst 
Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall states that the CCF 94th 
Regiment attacked the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment on November 
25, while two unidentified Chinese regiments struck the 2 3rd 
and 3 8th Infantry Regiments.6 This statement by Marshall is 
inaccurate because there was no CCF 94th Regiment serving in 
the Chinese Communist Forces then deployed in Korea.7 In
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all fairness to Marshall, much of the information on the CCF 
was still classified as "Secret" by the United States Army 
when his book was published in 1953. Nevertheless Marshall 
never wrote a revised edition of The River and the Gauntlet, 
and so his flawed information on the size and identity of 
the Chinese force attacking the U.S. Second Infantry 
Division on the night of November 25, 1950 remained intact.
In Ebb and Flow, the official United States Army 
historian of this portion of the Korean War, Billy C. 
Mossman, accepts the presence of three Chinese regiments. 
Mossman states that two CCF regiments struck the 9th 
Infantry while infiltrating elements of those two regiments 
hit the Second Division artillery and 23rd Infantry, and one 
CCF regiment attacked the 38th Infantry. Although 
identifying the CCF 40th Army as having faced the Second 
Division, Mossman does not identify the actual regiments 
that he believes made the initial attacks.8
Roy Appleman states in his ponderous work Disaster in 
Korea, that "the CCF 120th Division, 40th Army, led the 
Chinese Army's attack against the US 2nd Division." Based 
on Chinese prisoner interrogation reports, Appleman 
identifies the CCF 3 58th and 3 59th Infantry Regiments (of 
the CCF 12 0th Division) as the force that struck the U.S.
9th Infantry Regiment, and slipped past the 9th to strike 
the 2 3rd Infantry and the 2nd Division artillery.9
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Appleman is more vague in his estimate of Chinese 
strength in their attack on the 38th Infantry Regiment on 
the 2nd Division's right flank. "It is apparent", states 
Appleman, "that by daylight of 2 6 November large numbers of 
CCF from the 40th Army, and probably also from the 38th 
Army, were behind Colonel Peploe's 38th Infantry east of the 
Chongchon River."10
Based on an analysis of the intelligence reports filed 
by the Second Infantry Division, prisoner interrogation 
reports on Chinese soldiers captured in the fighting, and my 
interviews with survivors of the U.S. Second Infantry
Division, I have concluded that the entire Chinese 120th
t-
Division struck the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment on the night 
of November 25, 1950. As the CCF 120th Division's attack 
rolled over the 9th Regiments's 3rd and 1st Battalions, a 
regimental sized detachment forded the Chongchon River, and 
struck the division artillery and 23rd Infantry Regiment. 
Another Chinese Division (either the CCF 118th or 119th) 
attacked the 38th Infantry Regiment.11
Although my estimation of Chinese strength is triple 
the size of the conventional figure used by other military 
historians, it should be noted that I believe this figure to 
still be a conservative estimate. For even with my higher 
estimate of enemy troop strength the CCF 4 0th Army, which 
made the opening attack against the Second Infantry
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Division, would have still had an entire division in reserve 
and unengaged.
Among the more serious losses to the 38th Infantry 
Regiment in the first night of battle, was Company G, which 
had seemingly disappeared.12 Sergeant Robert Hammersmith 
commanded a 57-mm recoilless rifle squad in Company C of the 
3 8th Infantry Regiment. As the sun rose over the 
battlefield on the morning of November 2 6th, Hammersmith 
gazed through his binoculars at Company G's hilltop position 
of the night before, and saw that it was "crawling" with 
Chinese infantry. "Just like a swarm of locusts" recalled 
Hammersmith, "they were all over the hillside, and I 
couldn't see any Americans." Hammersmith's gun crew set up 
their 57-mm recoilless rifle, and began firing into the mass 
of Chinese, at 1800 to 2000 yards range. "We were using 
high explosive and white phosphorous shells" stated 
Hammersmith, "just trying to inflict as many casualties as 
we could."13
The Americans had better weapons than Hammersmith's 
recoilless rifle with which to attack the Chinese in 
daylight, and these instruments of destruction were not long 
in coming. Like avenging harpies, U.S. Air Force B-2 6 
Invaders, F-51 Mustangs, and F-80 Shooting Stars swept down 
on those Chinese who had not sought cover after daylight 
arrived.14 The Air Force planes strafed the Chinese with
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cannons and machineguns and scourged them with fire from 
thousands of gallons of napalm. Hundreds of Chinese were 
blasted apart or burned alive, and the survivors fled back 
into the hills. The War Diary of the Second Infantry 
Division recorded that the airstrikes produced "excellent 
results.1,15
Backed by these airstrikes, the Second Infantry 
Division launched limited counterattacks of its own.
Colonel Paul Freeman formed a task force composed of four 
rifle companies and a tank battalion, and launched an attack 
on the Chinese infiltration force holding Hill 329, the 
"Chinaman's Hat". Backed by airstrikes and supported with 
the combined firepower of the division artillery, Freeman's 
task force attacked up the steep slopes of Chinaman's Hat.
Sergeant John A. Pittman commanded an infantry squad of 
Company C, 23rd Infantry Regiment, and was in the lead 
elements of the task force as the attack began. In the face 
of intense Chinese machinegun and mortar fire, Brown led his 
squad forward. Despite being wounded several times by 
mortar shrapnel, Brown continued to advance right up to the 
Chinese lines, until suddenly a grenade landed right in the 
middle of his squad. Without hesitation, Pittman flung 
himself on top of the enemy grenade, absorbing the blast 
with his body. As a medical aid man reached him, Pittman's 
first request was to know how many of his men had been hit.
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Pittman would survive his wounds, to become the only man in
the Battle of the Chongchon River to win his nation's
highest award; the Medal of Honor. The Medal of Honor
citation stated:
Sergeant Pittman distinguished himself by 
conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and 
beyond the call of duty, in action against the 
enemy. Sergeant Pittman's extraordinary heroism 
reflects the highest credit upon himself, and is 
in keeping with the esteemed traditions of the 
military service.16
In spite of such individual acts of courage, the 
Chinese held their positions. The level of resistance that 
Freeman's task force encountered revealed that the enemy 
holding Chinaman's Hat was well dug-in, and had been heavily 
reinforced during the pre-dawn hours of November 2 6th. 
Against this fierce Chinese resistance, Freeman's attack 
ground to a halt. Thus a major pocket of enemy resistance 
remained intact, almost two miles behind the main line of 
resistance of the Second Infantry Division.17
In the 38th Infantry Regiment's sector, Lt. Colonel 
Reginald Hinton commanding the 38th's Regimental Tank 
Company, was still full of fight when daylight broke.
Hinton observed the former positions of the 38th Regiment's 
3rd Battalion Command Post through his binoculars from a 
nearby hill. Chinese soldiers occupied the command post 
area, and were milling about looting the tents and supply 
trucks, as well as searching the bodies of the dead for
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anything of value. More disturbing to Hinton, was the fact
that he could see the tents of the 3rd Battalion aid station
still standing. The aid station had been left behind when
3rd Battalion retreated during the night, and Hinton feared
for the lives of any wounded men who may have been left
behind in the aid station tents. Unable to contact
regimental headquarters, Hinton decided on his own
initiative to counterattack and retake the 3rd Battalion
Command Post. Hinton recalled:
We encountered some minor resistance from what 
appeared to be Chinese rear guard personnel, some 
of which were engaged in looting. We also picked 
up several U.S. soldiers who had become separated 
from their units or had been wounded. We soon 
reached the battalion command post area, and I 
observed that the position had been well defended, 
as evidenced by many killed and wounded [Chinese] 
at the approaches to the position. I also saw 
from the dead enemy soldiers, that they were well 
set up. Many of the dead Chinese were armed with 
Thompson sub-machineguns. We policed these up, 
and later put them to good use against the Chinese 
in the battle. It was later determined that the 
[3rd] battalion had been forced to withdraw 
southward during the night of fighting [because 
of] the exposure of their right flank by the 
disappearance of the 2d ROK Corps.18
The developments of the first night of battle, with the 
heavy assaults against the 9th Infantry, coupled with 
attacks against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division on the 
Second's left, led Major General Keiser to believe that the 
objective of the Chinese attack was to break through on his 
left flank and separate the Second Infantry Division from
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the rest of 8th Army to the west, by penetrating down the
Chongchon River valley.19
In an attempt to foil this supposed enemy stratagem,
Keiser took steps to bolster the heavily damaged 9th
Infantry Regiment holding his left flank. Two infantry
battalions from the 23rd Infantry Regiment were moved into
position on the 9th Infantry's right flank astride the
Chongchon River.20 In addition the 2nd Engineer Combat
Battalion was ordered to join the 9th Regiment and go into
the line as infantry.21 Commanding a platoon of engineers
in the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion was Lieutenant James
Malone and he recalled:
My platoon was working on the road that served as 
the MSR [main supply route] for the division, when 
we got a message about 1400 hours to return to the 
company area and reorganize as infantry. No one 
briefed us on the situation, but the mere fact 
that we engineers were being committed as infantry 
communicated to the last pioneer soldier that the 
situation was in itself desperate.22
Keiser also reorganized the Second Infantry Division's 
artillery battalions. The 61st and 99th Field Artillery 
were returned to the U.S. First Cavalry Division on orders 
from 8th Army. This move was ordered by 8th Army commander 
Lieutenant General Walton Walker to bring the First Cavalry 
Division, then in 8th Army reserve, up to full strength 
preparatory to its being committed to the battle now 
developing along the Chongchon River.23 Reiser's remaining
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artillery battalions were organized as follows:
15th Field Artillery - Direct Support 23rd Infantry Regiment
37th Field Artillery - Direct Support 9th Infantry Regiment
38th Field Artillery - Attached 38th Infantry Regiment
503rd Field Artillery - General Support 
17th Field Artillery - General Support24
As these moves were being carried out, the Second 
Infantry Division encountered resistance from hundreds of 
Chinese infiltrators operating both in and behind the 
division's positions,25 These infiltrators set up 
roadblocks, and harassed American units as they attempted to 
move into position. The rugged terrain of the Chongchon 
battlefield, made cross country movement by American 
vehicles impossible.
All tanks, trucks, and jeeps, along with any equipment 
(such as artillery) that they might be towing, had to use 
the primitive road network of the area for movement.
Chinese infantry, unencumbered by heavy equipment or 
vehicles, moved nimbly and quickly over the rugged hills and 
steep valleys that were impassable to United States forces. 
Although American units, with their plethora of vehicles, 
were theoretically much more mobile than Chinese forces, in 
reality the rough terrain and poor road network of the 
battlefield actually gave the advantage to the CCF.
Realizing the importance of the road network to the
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American forces, the Chinese began establishing roadblocks 
behind American lines with their infiltrators. These 
roadblocks were often merely some logs and large rocks that 
were laid in the road, and were usually lightly defended as 
they were manned only by small infiltration groups. But the 
roadblocks proved to be a source of constant harassment for 
the Second Infantry Division during the Battle of the 
Chongchon River, and were a harbinger of the disaster which 
was to come.
By the morning of November 2 6th, only the 2nd Battalion 
of Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment remained 
intact. The 9th Regiment's 1st and 3rd Battalions had been 
decimated, and only scattered individuals and platoons 
remained of them.26 Sloane was ordered to reform his 
regiment into defensive positions, and prepare for a renewed 
Chinese attack that night.
As the 9th Regiment made its preparations, Major 
Cesides Barberis, commanding the 9th Regiment's 2nd 
Battalion, became concerned over the large numbers of 
wounded men from the 1st and 3rd Battalions that had 
accumulated in his aid station. Fearing for the safety of 
these wounded men should the Chinese renew their offensive, 
and needing his battalion aid station to be clear to handle 
any new casualties that would result from the Chinese 
attack, Barberis gave the order to evacuate as many of the
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wounded men as possible to safety. As his men began 
preparing to withdraw the wounded, Barberis learned that 
infiltrating Chinese had established a roadblock along the 
only road leading south out of the 9th Regiment's positions. 
Corporal James L. Brown of Company E, 2nd Battalion, 9th 
Infantry Regiment was placed in charge of the casualties 
with orders to break through the enemy roadblock and get the 
wounded men to safety.27
Moving south along the road in a truck convoy, Brown 
soon discovered the enemy roadblock. Approximately fifteen 
to twenty Chinese were established in a culvert which 
crossed under train tracks on the left side of the road. 
Sizing up the situation, Brown had the "walking wounded" in 
his column place suppressing fire on the Chinese, while he 
took two men and commandeered an abandoned railroad hand 
car.28
Pushing the hand car in front of themselves for cover 
Brown and his two men ran down the train tracks towards the 
Chinese position, firing their rifles as they came. The 
Chinese met Brown with small arms fire and grenades. 
Undeterred, Brown and his two comrades ran right into the 
Chinese manning the roadblock. As his rifle ran out of 
ammunition Brown did not pause to reload, but instead leaped 
into the remaining Chinese, clubbing them to death with his 
rifle. Brown's intrepid action cleared the road, and
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allowed the wounded men to be withdrawn to safety. For this 
action, Corporal James L. Brown received the Distinguished 
Service Cross, the United States Army's second highest award 
for bravery in battle.29
As the Second Infantry Division shifted into defensive 
positions, disturbing news reached General Reiser's 
headquarters. Large numbers of South Korean soldiers were 
arriving in the 38th Infantry Regiment's sector. 
Interrogation of the South Koreans revealed that they were 
from the ROK 3rd Infantry Regiment, and that the entire ROK 
II Corps had collapsed and was in full retreat on the Second 
Division's right flank!30
The ROK II Corps, composed of the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th 
Divisions, was on the right flank of the Second Infantry 
Division, and had reported on the 24th and 25th of November 
that they were meeting stiff enemy resistance to their 
advance up the spine of the rugged Myomyang Mountain 
range.31 On the night of November 25, and during the early 
morning hours of November 26, 1950, the ROK II Corps was 
struck with a massive attack by the CCF 38th and 42nd Armies 
which smashed open the front of the South Koreans. Major 
General Yu Hae Ueng, commanding general of the ROK II Corps, 
moved swiftly in an attempt to seal the breach in his lines. 
But as Yu attempted to move up his reserves through the 
mountainous terrain, he found the roads blocked by Chinese
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infiltrators and North Korean guerrillas. Outnumbered, 
outmaneuvered, and outfought, the front of the ROK II Corps 
collapsed, as the survivors of the ROK 8th and 7th Divisions 
dissolved into a panic stricken mob fleeing south. Only the 
ROK 3rd Regiment, which had been missed by the main Chinese 
attack, and the understrength ROK 6th Division some 2 5 miles 
to the rear in ROK II Corps reserve, survived the initial 
Chinese assault.32
Both during and after the Korean War, American soldiers 
severely criticized the fighting abilities of their South 
Korean ally. This American belief that the South Koreans 
were poor soldiers was shared not only by other United 
Nations forces, but by the Communist enemy as well. From 
their initial intervention to their final offensives of the 
Korean War, the Chinese Communist Forces routinely made the 
South Koreans the target of their initial assault, in order 
to better their chances at achieving a breach in the United 
Nations front. The failures of the South Korean soldiery 
were in large part due to inadequacies in training and 
equipment, rather than any lack of courage on the part of 
the South Koreans.
The small standing army of 98,000 men that South Korea 
possessed at the beginning of the Korean War on June 25, 
1950, was decimated in the early stages of the fighting.33 
Whole divisions had to be rebuilt with raw recruits
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conscripted from the rice fields and city streets of South 
Korea. These South Korean draftees were officially given 
only ten days of training, and many times less, before being 
hurled into the inferno of battle.34 In contrast, American 
soldiers received 12 weeks of basic training followed by 
advanced training once they were assigned to a unit.35 
North Korean and Chinese soldiers received an average of six 
to eight weeks of instruction before being committed to the 
front.36
In addition to the lack of training, equipment 
shortages also plagued the ROK army. South Korean divisions 
possessed only a fraction of the normal complement of 
machineguns and mortars assigned to a United States 
division, and their artillery support was limited to a 
single battalion of 105-mm howitzers. Even in terms of 
numbers, a South Korean division contained only 60 percent 
of the strength of a United States Army division; although 
in numbers alone this was also the approximate strength of 
Chinese and North Korean divisions.37
The ROK II Corps provides an excellent example of the 
deficiencies found in the South Korean army. Of the three 
divisions (6th, 7th & 8th) composing the ROK II Corps at the 
Battle of the Chongchon River, only the 8th Division was at 
full strength. The ROK 7th Division had almost been 
destroyed in the summer battles with the North Koreans, and
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was completely rebuilt with half-trained draftees. The ROK 
6th Division had suffered heavy casualties in battles with 
the Chinese forces near Unsan, North Korea just three weeks 
earlier, and had received virtually no replacements for its 
lost men and equipment.38
Against the undermanned and underequipped ROK II Corps 
the Chinese hurled two veteran armies (CCF 38th and CCF 
42nd), each over 30,000 men strong, and coordinated this 
assault with North Korean guerrilla attacks in the South 
Koreans rear area. By noon of November 26th the ROK II 
Corps had collapsed, its survivors streaming southward and 
still under attack by pursuing Chinese forces. The right 
flank of the Second Infantry Division had now become the 
right flank of the whole Eighth Army, and was in serious 
danger of being turned.39
In Eighth Army Headquarters, the collapse of the ROK II 
Corps was still treated as a "local enemy counterattack".
The Second Infantry Division's report of the arrival of the 
ROK 3rd Regiment in its lines alerted Eighth Army 
headquarters to the fact that the ROKs were retreating, but 
just how serious their defeat had been was still not 
appreciated by Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General 
Walton Walker on November 2 6th.40
Colonel George Peploe, commanding the Second Division's 
38th Infantry Regiment, also was not certain of the
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situation he faced either. If what Peploe had learned from 
the surviving ROK 3rd Regiment was true, then there was 
nothing on his right flank but retreating South Koreans and 
unknown numbers of Chinese. Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment 
held the right flank of the Second Infantry Division, and 
the Second Infantry Division had now become the right flank 
of the entire Eighth Army. Reacting to this situation, 
Peploe attached the remnants of the ROK 3rd Regiment to his 
command, and then bent the lines of his 3rd Battalion to the 
south, so as to refuse his right flank to any enemy 
threat.41
Peploe was concerned about the fate of his Company G as 
well, because they had not been heard from since the first 
night of the battle. Worried that there might be survivors 
of Company G trapped behind Chinese lines, and determined to 
maintain his hold on the narrow supply road to his rear, 
Peploe ordered Company C of the 38th to go out and retake 
"George" Company's lost position.42 Sergeant Robert 
Hammersmith, commanding a recoilless rifle squad in Company 
C recalled:
Our company commander, Captain Taylor, got orders 
from regiment to go out and help George Company.
And I remember Captain Taylor told the Colonel 
[Peploe] that it was suicide, because we could see 
them [the Chinese] out there in front of us. And 
the Colonel said 'Those are your orders.'43
Just before dusk on the night of November 2 6th,
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Hammersmith and the rest of Charlie Company of the 3 8th 
Infantry Regiment, dropped their backpacks and extra gear so 
as to travel as light as possible, and headed towards 
Company G's former position 2000 yards to their front.
Moving over the rugged hills, Charlie Company was able to 
cover only a few hundred yards before darkness once more 
covered the battlefield. A feeling of uneasiness crept over 
the men as they struggled over the broken ground, shivering 
as the temperature steadily dropped, and a light snow began 
to fall. No one in Charlie Company was certain just what 
was waiting for them in the gathering darkness but, whatever 
it was, it had destroyed George Company, and they were 
heading right for it.44
"Americans, you surrender we no kill!" The heavily 
accented words startled Hammersmith and the rest of Charlie 
Company. Men dove for cover, as the sound of rifles being 
locked and loaded clattered along Charlie Company's column. 
After going only 800 yards, Company C had walked right into 
an enemy trap. Again the oriental voice called out 
"Americans, you surrender we no kill!" Recovering from 
their initial shock, the Americans shouted back profanity 
into the darkness. "When that happened, they (the Chinese)
just opened up" recalled Hammersmith, "They just started
.1
raking the valley with machinegun fire."45
Realizing now that he had walked into an ambush,
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Captain Taylor maneuvered his company so as to seize the 
high ground. Leaving the 3rd Platoon as a base of fire to 
cover the move, Taylor attacked the hill on his left flank 
with his remaining three platoons. Tracers from the
a
encircling Chinese machineguns crisscrossed the slopes of 
the hill, but the suddenness of the American attack confused 
the Chinese, and Charlie Company soon seized the top of the 
hill.46
Hammersmith's recoilless rifle gunner was wounded in 
the ambush. Consequently, Hammersmith found himself 
carrying his own weapon plus the 47 pound 57-mm recoilless 
rifle up the hillside. Struggling with his heavy load, 
Hammersmith fell behind the attacking platoons.
Hammersmith:
I felt someone's shoulder hit me in the butt as I 
was climbing this hill. Well at this time it was 
dark and I didn't know who the hell it was, but I 
just felt somebody's shoulder hit me right in the 
butt and started pushing me up the hill. So I 
said 'Come on let's go!' When we got to the top 
of the hill, I turned around and looked, and it 
was a Chinese man!47
A group of three Chinese had followed the Americans up 
the hillside, not to fight them but rather to surrender to 
them. The Chinese were apparently unarmed, and the 
Americans quickly tied their hands and feet and placed a 
guard on them. Captain Taylor rapidly formed Charlie 
Company into a defensive perimeter along the crest of the
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hill, and laid down suppressing fire to cover the withdrawal 
of his 3rd Platoon from their covering position in the 
valley, up the hillside to join the rest of the company.48
Charlie Company had escaped the initial Chinese ambush, 
but now found themselves cut off from their battalion by 
large numbers of Chinese who they could see as flickering 
black shadows, swarming on the ridges and in the valleys 
around them. The blaring of bugles, and the answering calls 
from whistles and gongs, revealed to them that large numbers 
of Chinese were readying for an attack on the 38th Infantry 
Regiment. Captain Taylor tried to reach regimental 
headquarters by radio, both to warn headquarters of the 
impending Chinese attack and to request help. But all 
attempts failed, as the rugged countryside of Korea blocked 
the radio transmission. Taylor then ordered runners to be 
sent out to try and slip past the encircling Chinese, and 
reach the 38th Regiment's lines. But as the hours went by, 
the runners did not return, and the Chinese attack was now 
beginning in full force against the 38th Infantry 
Regiment.49
Help suddenly came to the men of Charlie Company from 
an unexpected source. One of the Chinese prisoners spoke 
excellent English, and he told his besieged captors that he 
knew a way through the Chinese positions. According to 
Hammersmith, Taylor at first rejected the offer out of hand.
But with the failure of the runners, and knowing that at any 
moment the Chinese might decide to eliminate the cut-off 
Americans, Taylor gave his approval. Sergeant Hammersmith 
and the others loosed the bonds on the Chinese prisoners, 
and warned them of just what they would do to them if this 
was a trick. As his recoilless rifle was now out of 
ammunition, and not wanting to be slowed by its weight, 
Hammersmith disassembled the weapon in the darkness, and 
"scattered the parts to the four winds". Then he and the 
rest of Charlie Company moved out, following the lead of 
their Chinese prisoner. Learning a lesson in infiltration 
from their Chinese captive, Charlie Company succeeded in 
slipping past the encircling Chinese, and at first light on 
November 27th, reached their original positions from where 
they had set out early on the previous evening.50
Reaching friendly positions, Taylor's half-frozen men 
eagerly headed for a fire that had just been started in the 
company area. Their Chinese prisoners moved over by the 
fire as well, and as they warmed themselves the Chinese 
removed their bulky, padded jackets. When the Chinese 
removed their jackets, the Americans were shocked to see 
that all three Chinese had loaded Thompson sub-machineguns 
strapped to their backs! In the darkness and excitement, no 
one had thought to actually search the Chinese prisoners, 
who had appeared to be unarmed. As hoarse shouts of
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profanity rang out, the Americans quickly knocked the 
Chinese to the ground and stripped them of their weapons.
In spite of the commotion they caused, the Chinese had shown 
no interest in using their weapons, and seemed "happy to be 
out of the war." Recalled Hammersmith: "If they (the 
Chinese prisoners) had wanted to, they could have killed 
everybody there, especially when we were trying to slip past 
their buddies. "51
Hammersmith later had a chance to talk to the Chinese 
prisoner who spoke English. According to Hammersmith, the 
Chinese prisoner had graduated from UCLA, and then returned 
to China to try and bring the rest of his family to the 
United States. While in China, a Chinese Communist unit 
came through his village looking for "volunteers" for their 
army. "Well, they call it 'volunteering'" stated the 
Chinese prisoner to Hammersmith, "when they come through 
your village and say 'Either you join us or we kill you and 
your family'.1,52
Peploe's company-sized probe of the Chinese lines to 
his front was a bold move, considering the size of the 
Chinese force confronting the 38th Infantry Regiment on the 
night of November 26, 1950. Peploe was unaware of the 
actual strength of the Chinese force in his sector, and 
perhaps Charlie Company's true mission had been to ascertain 
just how many Chinese the 38th Regiment was facing. Unknown
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to Peploe, elements of two Chinese Armies (4 0th, and 3 8th) 
were at that time to his north and northeast. A third 
Chinese army (42nd) was sweeping southwest through the gap 
on his right flank where the ROK II Corps had been, 
attempting to come in behind Peploe's regiment and the rest 
of the Second Infantry Division.53
As stated earlier Major General Keiser, commanding 
general of the Second Infantry Division, was convinced by 
the previous night's fighting that the main enemy attack was 
aimed at his left flank and center, down the Chongchon River 
valley. Keiser's maneuvers of November 2 6th had been 
designed to bolster that section of his front, while he left 
the hard pressed 38th Infantry Regiment to fend for itself 
on the right.54
One of Keiser's maneuvers had been to assign the 2nd 
Engineer Combat Battalion as infantry to the 9th Regiment. 
Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had suffered 
heavy losses on the night of November 25th, and essentially 
only Major Barberis' 2nd Battalion was still intact when 
night fell on November 26th. Sergeant Harry Lohmeyer was 
manning a .50 caliber machinegun with the 2nd Engineers when 
they took up positions on a small hill, just west of the ice 
choked Chongchon River, on the night of November 2 6th. "We 
were to backup the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry 
Regiment" recalled Lohmeyer.55
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In spite of the reinforcements Keiser had sent them, 
the heavy casualties that the 9th Infantry had suffered in 
the previous night's battle left them in no shape for 
another major fight. But as bugles bleated through the 
frigid night air, and Chinese signal rockets went up along 
their lines, the men of the 9th Infantry realized that their 
battle was far from over. Once more the Chinese 40th Army 
rose to the attack, and once again the battered 9th Infantry 
Regiment was their main target.56
The remnants of the 9th Infantry Regiment, as well as 
the two battalions from the 2 3rd Infantry Regiment which had 
been brought up to reinforce the 9th's right flank, were 
soon under heavy attack. The Chinese attack was more subtle 
this time, as they probed for weakness in the 9th Infantry's 
defensive positions. The Chinese soon found their weakspot, 
the battered survivors of the 9th Infantry's 3rd Battalion.
Colonel Charles Sloane, commanding the 9th Infantry, 
knew that the decimated 3rd Battalion's position was the 
weak link in his defensive position, which is why he had 
deployed the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion as a "backstop" 
to this unit. Even with this added support, the 3rd 
Battalion was still hurting from the heavy losses it had 
sustained the previous night. Once the Chinese ascertained 
where the American line was weakest, they massed their units 
opposite this point and attacked in great strength,
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supported by mortar and machinegun fire. The Chinese rained 
blows down on the 3rd Battalion and under the intense enemy 
pressure, the battered battalion began falling back.
From their reserve position, the 2nd Engineers had been 
spectators to the opening rounds of the Chinese attack. 
However, at approximately 2345 hours on November 26th, the 
2nd Engineers were informed via radio that the remnants of 
the 9th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion would be 
withdrawing through their lines. With this in mind, the 2nd 
Engineers were not too concerned when from out of the 
darkness appeared a large formation of soldiers, walking 
towards the Engineer's lines with slung weapons. Without a 
sound, the soldiers moved like phantoms across the silvery 
snow, until they were only twenty yards from Sergeant 
Lohmeyer's .50-caliber machinegun position. Suddenly 
Corporal Lark, manning a .30-caliber machinegun some fifteen 
yards to Lohmeyer's left, screamed "Americans my ass!" and 
cut loose with his machinegun on the enemy column. "All 
hell broke loose then" recalled Lohmeyer, "and before we 
knew it we and the Chinese were engaged in some real heavy 
fighting" .57
As the fight was joined, the initial Chinese force was 
soon heavily reinforced as, to the blare of bugles and 
banging of gongs, large waves of Chinese attacked the 2nd 
Engineers across the nightmarish, blue-black landscape of
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the battlefield. Recalled Lohmeyer:
As during previous engagements, I [was] having 
trouble maintaining the realization that I was in 
a major life threatening situation. My mind kept 
putting me in a position of removal from the 
action. I can still remember feeling like a 
spectator viewing a war movie.58
Chinese concussion grenades began landing all around 
Lohmeyer's gun position, and his assistant gunner was felled 
by Chinese small arms fire. Lohmeyer, an experienced 
engineer, had dug a good fighting position for his .50- 
caliber machinegun, and it protected him from the enemy 
fire. Within the shelter of this position Lohmeyer 
inflicted heavy casualties with his machinegun on the 
attacking Chinese infantry. Then suddenly a concussion 
grenade landed right in his position, "blowing my boot 
apart, leaving my leg. numb, and my head feeling like a used 
accordion.1,59
Dazed by the blow, Lohmeyer nevertheless continued to 
fire his weapon at the onrushing Chinese. But the large 
Chinese assault waves merely flowed around and past 
Lohmeyer, sweeping over the hill. The dead were soon piled 
high in front of the 2nd Engineers' position, but onward the 
Chinese came, seemingly heedless of their own losses. The 
Chinese assault waves that had swept past the engineers' 
hilltop position, reformed on the other side of the hill, 
and began attacking the engineers from the rear. In danger
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of being surrounded and completely destroyed, the 2nd 
Engineers began to fall back.
"With their continuous frontal attacks and massive 
numbers" recalled Lohmeyer, "they finally overran our 
position, and kicked us off of the hill, with heavy losses 
to their side." Ordered to withdraw by his commanding 
officer, Lohmeyer took out the two sections of his 
machinegun's bolt (thus disabling the weapon) and began 
retreating down the hillside, heading towards the Chongchon 
River.60
Major Barberis' 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry 
Regiment had not been engaged on the first night of battle, 
and now he again found his battalion unengaged. While the 
battle raged all around it, the 2nd Battalion received 
orders from their regimental commander Colonel Charles 
Sloane to cross to the east side of the Chongchon River, and 
reinforce the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 
which was holding the right flank of the 9th Infantry 
Regiment on the east bank of the Chongchon River. The enemy 
forces holding the "Chinaman's Hat" had attacked down its 
icy slopes shortly after darkness, and were driving the 2 3rd 
Regiment back down the valley of the Chongchon. Determined 
not to once again miss the battle, Barberis readied his 
battalion to cross the Chongchon and reinforce the 
beleaguered 23rd Regiment. As Barberis' battalion prepared
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to move, however, they were suddenly hit by a full-scale 
Chinese assault. Caught off balance, the 2nd Battalion was 
sent reeling back towafds the icy waters of the Chongchon.
In the 2nd Battalion's aid station on the night of 
November 2 6th was PFC Robert Bruce, one of the survivors of 
the 9th Infantry's 1st Battalion, who had been wounded and 
suffered a concussion in the previous night's fighting. As 
the sounds of battle grew to a roar outside the aid station, 
Bruce feared that the 2nd Battalion was going to be overrun. 
An American officer suddenly burst into the tent and said 
the battalion was withdrawing, and asked if there were any 
wounded men there who could still fight. Bruce and several 
other "walking wounded" volunteered. Bruce explained that 
he was not trying to be a hero by volunteering, just trying 
to survive. The 1st Battalion's Aid Station had been 
overrun the night before, and the wounded men there 
massacred by the Chinese. Bruce was not sure which way the 
battle was going, but if they were asking for walking 
wounded to join the fight, then he knew the situation must 
be getting desperate. Deciding he had a better chance 
fighting than laying in the hospital tent, Bruce and the 
other volunteers were handed rifles and ammunition and sent 
out into the darkness to join the battle.61
Bruce and the others did not have to go very far 
because the Chinese assault waves were already lapping at
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the 2nd Battalion's Command Post and Aid Station area. As 
tracers from the machineguns of both sides crisscrossed 
through the darkness, the sounds of battle reached Bruce's 
ears. The long "brrrrrp" of the Chinese sub-machineguns, 
the crack of American and Chinese rifles, and the muffled 
explosions from hand grenades filled the frigid night air. 
American artillery was also at work, pounding away at the 
back of the Chinese formations, and then working their fire 
ever closer to the American lines, until the big shells were 
dropping a scant fifty yards in front of the 2nd Battalion's 
positions.62
But many Chinese had already penetrated to within a few 
feet of the 2nd Battalion and, to the blare of bugles, they 
rose as one and rushed the Americans. Bruce and the other 
walking wounded were moving towards a low earthen embankment 
when the Chinese made their rush. Bruce opened fire with 
his rifle, dropping several of the Chinese attackers. But 
then the metallic "ping" of his empty Ml clip ejecting 
itself signaled his need to reload. By that time the 
Chinese were only a few feet away, and so Bruce turned his 
Ml and swung it as a club at the nearest Chinese, striking 
the enemy soldier full in the face with the steel butt-plate 
of the rifle. After that, a wild melee ensued as the fight 
became hand-to-hand. Swinging his clubbed rifle, Bruce 
felled several more Chinese then broke free of the melee to
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join the main body of the 2nd Battalion which was now 
withdrawing east across the Chongchon River. Once again, 
Bruce plunged into the icy waters of the Chongchon River, as 
he and the rest of the men with the 2nd Battalion (including 
survivors of the 1st & 3rd battalions) waded across to join 
in a defensive position with the 2 3rd Infantry Regiment.63
Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry Regiment had come 
under heavy attack at approximately 203 0 hours on November 
26th, just prior to the Chinese assault on the 9th Infantry 
Regiment. Holding the Second Infantry Division's center, 
the 2 3rd Regiment's lines were assailed by large numbers of 
Chinese, attacking in at least division strength. Again the 
Chinese showed their uncanny ability to infiltrate past 
American frontline units, as a Chinese infiltration team 
slipped past the 2 3rd Regiment's 1st Battalion and attacked 
Freeman's regimental command post itself. Surprised to find 
such large numbers of enemy in their rear area, the lightly 
armed headquarters staff fought back as best they could, but 
were soon forced to retreat.
In his haste to withdraw, Colonel Freeman left his code 
books and other classified information in his tent. Upon 
reaching his 1st Battalion's Command Post, Freeman regrouped 
and led a counter-attack in an attempt to retake his 
regimental headquarters, and recover the lost code books. 
Freeman's attack was soon halted by intense Chinese
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machinegun and mortar fire, and it became apparent that the 
Chinese now held the former positions of the 2 3rd Regimental 
Command Post in great strength. The battle turned into a 
long range firefight, with the Americans gradually achieving 
the upper hand.64
The remnants of the 9th Infantry Regiment, meanwhile, 
regrouped on the east bank of the Chongchon River, and held 
their ground, inflicting heavy loss on the Chinese 
attackers. Shortly after daybreak, Freeman again attacked 
up the valley of the Chongchon and this time succeeded in 
recovering his regimental command post at 0845 hours on the 
morning of November 27th. Luckily, Freeman found his tent 
undisturbed, and his code books and maps safe.65 The 9th 
Infantry Regiment, gravely weakened though it was, followed 
up Freeman's success by attacking back across the Chongchon 
and retaking its lost position as well. Thus, although the 
Chinese attacks on November 26th had inflicted heavy 
casualties on the 9th and 2 3rd Infantry Regiments, their 
gains in territory proved to be only temporary. Having 
recovered from their initial shock and surprise at the 
strength of the Chinese force confronting them, the Second 
Infantry Division was beginning to strike back at its 
tormentor.
The casualties were mounting in the Second Infantry 
Division, however, and if the battle became one of attrition
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the Second had no hope against the overwhelming number of 
enemy forces opposing it.
Major General Keiser was not yet completely aware of 
the insurmountable pressure now beginning to build up on the 
Second Infantry Division's right flank, as thousands of 
Chinese poured through the gaping hole left by the 
retreating ROK II Corps. With Reiser's attention fixed on 
the frontal assault of the first two night's of the battle 
by the CCF 40th Army down the Chongchon River valley, he was 
slow to realize the fact that the main enemy effort was 
actually being directed against his right flank. Against 
this exposed flank the CCF 42nd and 38th Armies (app. 60,000 
men), having defeated the ROK II Corps, were now maneuvering 
to encircle and destroy not only the U.S. Second Infantry 
Division, but the entire Eighth United States Army in Korea. 
Only the battered U.S. Second Infantry Division now stood in 
the path of the onrushing Chinese. If the Chinese could get 
past the Second Division, they would be able to come in 
behind the Eighth Army and completely surround it.
Although Major General Keiser was still unaware of the 
overall Chinese plan, he did at least appreciate that the 
Chinese had now entered the Korean War in force and were 
launching a major offensive.66 Eighth Army Intelligence was 
only dimly aware of either of these facts, and highly 
skeptical of the grave danger that now faced the entire
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army. In its discussion of enemy capabilities and probable
course of action for the period ending at 2400 hours on
November 2 6th, EUSAK G-2 wrote:
Friendly unit withdrawals from north and northeast 
of Tokchon indicate a determined enemy effort in 
that area, however, [enemy] unit identification 
and strength estimates are not presently 
available. It should be considered possible that 
a determined enemy drive may be made in this area, 
especially considering the apparent exploitation 
opportunity after the limited withdrawal of 
friendly units on the east flank. However, with 
the possible exception of the relatively vague 
situation on the east flank, the enemy reaction to 
the EUSAK attack lias been one of active defense 
with local counterattacks in strength. This last 
is believed as the likely course of action.67
After two full nights of battle, the U.S. Second
Infantry Division had been knocked back on its heels and the
ROK II Corps had ceased to exist as a cohesive fighting
unit. Yet despite this evidence that a major offensive by
the Chinese army was underway, EUSAK G-2 still referred to
the massive Chinese assault as a "local counterattack."
Through the fog of battle the Dragon was striking, and
its victim could not even determine from where the blows
came. Over two thousand years before the Korean War, the
Chinese military philosopher Sun Tze wrote: "0 divine art of
subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible,
through you inaudible; and hence hold the enemy's fate in
our hands."68
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CHAPTER IV
RIGHT FLANK AND REARGUARD
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned, these defended,
And saved the sum of things for pay.
Alfred Housman, "Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries11
At dawn on November 27, 1950, the first rays of 
sunlight glinted off of the snow which covered the 
battlefield of the Chongchon River valley. The pristine 
beauty of the scene was horribly tainted by the twisted 
corpses of Chinese and American soldiers, which lay strewn 
in great heaps along the hillsides and valley floor. The 
lines of the U.S. Second Infantry Division had been bent but 
not broken, despite its two days and two nights of fierce 
battle against a numerically superior foe.1
In the center of the Second Division's line, the 2 3rd 
Infantry Regiment had with comparative ease retaken its 
ground lost on November 2 6th. The 2 3rd Regiment had mainly 
been fighting Chinese infiltrators who continued to grow in 
strength and attacked off of Hill 329, the "Chinaman's 
Hat."2 The Chinese had directed their main assaults at both 
flanks of the Second Infantry Division and were succeeding 
in slowly driving them in. The 9th Infantry Regiment held 
the left flank of the Second Division, and despite having 
suffered the heaviest losses of any of the division's
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regiments, counterattacked across the Chongchon River at 
first light and retook much of the ground it had 
relinquished the night before.3
On the right flank the 38th Infantry Regiment was 
living up to its nickname "The Rock of the Marne," and was 
holding its ground against fierce Chinese assaults. The 
Chinese attack on the 38 th Infantry Regiment continued into 
the daylight hours of the 27th, as large numbers of Chinese, 
in at least division strength, pressed their assault.4
As dawn broke, outposts of the 38th Regiment reported 
seeing a column of approximately 800 Chinese trotting 
straight towards the regimental command post. Simultaneously 
a large firefight erupted behind the command post, where the 
503rd Field Artillery was fighting for its guns as Chinese 
soldiers in a different column spilled into its positions.5
The headquarters staff of the 38th Infantry Regiment 
grabbed their weapons, and the I&R (Intelligence and 
Reconnaissance) Platoon of the headquarters formed a 
skirmish line behind the dike of a frozen rice paddy next to 
the command post. Captain Reginald Hinton had just pulled 
up in his jeep to report to headquarters on the night's 
fighting, when he saw the I&R Platoon formed up in the rice 
paddy. He grabbed his carbine and quickly joined the 
headquarters staff.6
As eyes peered into the half-light of dawn, a strange
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noise came to everyone's ears. Recalled regimental
operations officer Major Warren G. Hodges:
We heard this "pitty-pat" coming down through the 
snow, and here's this big black sergeant in his 
long-johns, with one boot on, coming down through 
the snow pitty-patting, and he says "Don't shoot!
I's an American and there's more coming."7
This sergeant came from the 503rd Field Artillery, many
of whose men remained in position. These men, after having
finally beaten back the Chinese force that had entered their
gun pits, saw the lead elements of the previously sighted
Chinese column come up through a draw, and head straight at
them and the 38th's regimental command post. But the 155-mm
guns of the 503rd were pointed in the opposite direction, as
they had been shelling the Chinese that had flanked the
command post. With the other Chinese column only a few
hundred yards away, there seemed to be no way that the guns
could be traversed in time. Then both Hodges and Hinton
witnessed an incredible event. Recalled Hodges:
We were amazed. There was one sergeant and one of 
his cannoneers that switched trails on a 155, that 
is they swung the piece around. It will only 
traverse so far right and left, and they needed to 
get it around further so they picked the trails up 
and swung it around. It's physically impossible 
for two people to do it, but I guess their 
adrenaline was running so high. They switched it 
around and fired point blank up the draw where the 
Chinese were coming out, it was just like shooting 
a rifle. Just splattered them [Chinese] all over 
the country, and pretty much cleaned that group of 
inf i1trators out.8
The Chinese succeeded in penetrating the 38th
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Regiment's position to the point where they appeared likely 
to sever the narrow dirt track which served as the 
regiment's only supply road. In a desperate attempt to 
maintain control over his supply road, Colonel George Peploe 
ordered his 38th Infantry Regiment to retake certain key 
roadside hills that had been lost in the previous night's 
fighting.9
Corporal Robert K. Imrie, a machinegunner in Company F,
3 8th Infantry Regiment, provided support fire for his
platoon as it advanced back up the hill they had lost the 
night before. Suddenly two Chinese machineguns, one on the 
left and one on the right, delivered a deadly cross-fire on 
the attacking Americans. Several men were hit, and the rest 
of the platoon dove onto the ground. As the Chinese 
machineguns raked the ground with their fire, it became 
apparent to Corporal Imrie that the entire platoon was in 
danger of being destroyed. Imrie stood up from his 
position, cradled his .30 caliber machinegun in his arms and 
charged directly at the Chinese machinegun on the right
flank, firing as he ran.10
Imrie's personal duel with the Chinese gun crew ended 
when he succeeded in killing all of them with his fire, 
whereupon the Chinese machingun crew on the opposite flank 
mortally wounded him with a burst of bullets. Imrie's 
platoon soon avenged him as, inspired by Imrie's bravery,
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they silenced this remaining Chinese machinegun, and secured 
the hill. For his valor Imrie was posthumously awarded the 
Distinguished Service Cross.11
As the commander of the Second Infantry Division, Major 
General Laurence Keiser, surveyed the scene of battle he 
realized that after haying fought against overwhelming odds 
for two days and two nights, his division could not continue 
to trade men with the Chinese army. With its right flank in 
mid-air, and heavy Chinese attacks continually striking its 
left flank, the Second Infantry Division's lines were being 
bent back onto each other in the shape of a horseshoe.
As reports of the fighting on the night of November 
26/27 1950, began to filter into Eighth Army Headquarters on 
the morning of November 27th, Lieutenant General Walton 
Walker at last began to realize the immense danger his right 
flank was in. Although unwilling to officially cancel the 
Eighth Army's offensive, Walker nevertheless began to pull 
all of his forward units back into defensive positions.12
Along the west coast of North Korea, the U.S. 24th 
Infantry Division and the ROK 12th Regiment, neither of 
which had encountered serious resistance thus far, were 
ordered to withdraw five miles south in order to consolidate 
into a defensive position near the ROK 1st Division.13
Elsewhere in Korea, the U.S. 1st Marine Division and 
U.S. 7th Infantry Division began to encounter heavy
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resistance from Chinese forces approximately 80 miles east 
of the Chongchon River battlefield, near the Chosin 
Reservoir. It was becoming painfully obvious to Lieutenant 
General Walker that the Chinese had entered the Korean War 
in great strength.14
By midday on November 27th, 1950, United Nations 
supreme commander General Douglas MacArthur also finally 
realized that the Chinese had launched a major offensive 
against his overextended forces in Korea. It is important 
to note that in his memoirs, MacArthur gives November 27, 
1950, as the date that the Chinese launched their offensive 
in Korea. Yet this date is two days later than when the 
offensive actually started. Even though the memoirs were 
published fourteen years after the battle, MacArthur still 
gives this erroneous date. This reveals that Walker was not 
alone in being slow to recognize the nature and scope of the 
Chinese intervention and indicates that perhaps he was even 
influenced by MacArthur's over-optimism.15
Regardless of his miscalculations over the past forty- 
eight hours, Walker had finally realized that the Chinese 
had entered the Korean War in force. Large numbers of 
Chinese soldiers were moving into the void left by the 
collapse of the ROK II Corps and appeared poised to envelop 
the Eighth Army's right flank. ROK II Corps commander 
General Yu Hae Ueng was making a valiant effort to collect
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stragglers from his shattered corps and deploy them into 
defensive positions near the village of Pukchang-ni.16
Even if Yu succeeded his new defensive position would 
be 2 0 miles southeast of the Second Infantry Division, thus 
leaving the Second's right flank still dangling in mid-air. 
The precarious position of the Second Infantry Division did 
not appear to bother Walker, as he was more concerned about 
the possibility of a Chinese drive towards the town of 
Sunchon, approximately 45 miles south of where the Second 
Division was fighting.17
Accordingly on November 27th, Walker decided to 
rearrange his units so as to protect against this Chinese 
threat to Sunchon. Walker altered the organizational 
structure of the Eighth Army so as to reinforce his IX Corps 
which now held the threatened right flank.
The IX Corps was reinforced by units drawn from Eighth 
Army reserve, so that by nightfall on November 27th, the IX 
Corps was comprised of the U.S. Second Infantry Division, 
U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, ROK 6th Division, British 
Commonwealth (CW) 27th Brigade, and the Turkish Brigade.18 
It thus appeared that Walker had strengthened his right 
flank, and lent great assistance to the beleaguered Second 
Infantry Division. But this reinforcement was illusory.
At the same time Walker reinforced the IX Corps, he 
also stripped it of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division which he
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reassigned to I Corps in the west. He also extended IX 
Corps area of operations, making it responsible for the 
former ROK II Corps positions and thus spreading its lines 
ever thinner.19
The assignment of the ROK 6th Division to the IX Corps 
provided little help for, as mentioned previously, this 
division was grievously understrength and in no shape to 
move north and bolster the Second Infantry Division. The 
ROK 6th Division remained in the vicinity of Pukchang-ni, 
and tried to collect up stragglers from the other units of 
the ROK II Corps.
The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division could have been sent 
north to reinforce the Second Infantry Division but, under 
orders from Eighth Army, its commander Major General Hobart 
Gay scattered his regiments. Gay moved his 7th and 8th 
Cavalry Regiments ten miles east into blocking positions 
near Sinchang-ni, behind the ROK 6th Division. Gay then 
sent his 5th Cavalry Regiment north but halted them at the 
village of Kaechon, approximately twenty miles south of the 
Second Infantry Division, to await developments. The 
British CW 27th Brigade remained in place at Sunchon as a 
reserve.20
Thus of all the units Walker used to reinforce the IX 
Corps, only the 5,000 man strong Turkish Brigade was 
actually ordered to move north and bolster the dangling
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right flank of the Second Infantry Division. Military 
historian and analyst Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall 
described the deployment of this lone Turkish Brigade 
against the two Chinese armies bearing down on the Second 
Division's right flank as "applying an aspirin bottle cork 
to the bunghole in a beer barrel. "21
Major General Keiser realized that his Second Infantry 
Division was becoming more and more isolated, and thus he 
decided to withdraw the Second Infantry Division 
approximately three miles south, to better defensive 
positions near the village of Kujang-dong. Thus after 
forty-eight hours of battle against overwhelming numbers of 
Chinese, with both of its flanks driven back and in danger 
of envelopment, the Second Infantry Division finally 
prepared to yield its forward ground.22
Keiser wanted to completely break contact with the 
Chinese and fall back to Sunchon, where the rest of IX Corps 
was deploying. Such a move would have endangered the 
elements of the Eighth Army in the west which had become 
overextended, and were trying to withdraw into defensive 
positions. Consequently, Walker ordered the Second Infantry 
Division to continue its delaying action against the 
advancing Chinese from its new defensive position near 
Kujang-dong. Walker intended to use the Second Division as 
a shield to stave off the Chinese offensive, while his other
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units withdrew and regrouped. The few would be sacrificed,
so that the many could be saved.23
The only help that came to the Second Infantry Division
during the Battle of the Chongchon River, was from the U.S.
Air Force. The official U.S. Air Force history of the
Korean War states that:
Although it was far from niggardly in allocating 
air support to the other Eighth Army divisions, 
the [USAF] Joint Operations Center gave priority 
to air-support requests received from the U.S. 2d 
Infantry Division, whose holding action was 
permitting other units to withdraw southward.24
These requests for air support poured into the Joint
Operations Center on November 27th, as the Second Infantry
Division reported large numbers of Chinese moving against it
in broad daylight. The skies over the Chongchon River
valley were clear and cold on November 27th making for good
flying weather.25 On that date, the U.S. Air Force flew
seventy-four sorties in support of the Second Infantry, some
of which produced spectacular results.26 One air strike
struck a group of 50 Chinese while they were crossing an
open field and "burned them to a crisp with napalm."27
In another sector of the Second Infantry Division
front, observers detected large numbers of Chinese filing
into a mine shaft, presumably to rest till darkness, safe
from the circling American aircraft. But American fighter-
bombers dived onto the mine shaft, scourging its entrance
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with napalm and then scoring several direct hits with 500- 
pound bombs. This attack caved in the entrance to the mine 
shaft and trapped an estimated 600 Chinese inside. It was 
determined by observers on the ground that all 600 Chinese 
perished in the attack.28
At 1900 hours on November 27, Keiser issued Operations 
Order #11 to the Second Infantry Division. This order 
called for the Second Infantry Division to withdraw three 
miles south and establish defensive positions along the 
hills and ridges outside the village of Kujang-dong. Having 
been ordered by Eighth Army to hold back the onrushing 
Chinese, Keiser at least wanted to make his stand on good 
ground. His order applied to all units of the Second 
Infantry Division except the decimated 9th Infantry 
Regiment, which due to its heavy losses was ordered to move 
further south and go into division reserve near Pugwon.29
The order was not to go into effect until 0600 hours on 
November 28th, which meant that the Second Infantry Division 
would have to undergo another night of combat in its present 
vulnerable defensive position. One can only speculate why 
Keiser chose not to make the withdrawal order effective 
until the following day. In all likelihood he was concerned 
that if the withdrawal were to begin when the order was 
issued in the late afternoon of the 27th, it would not be 
completed before nightfall. This would leave the Second
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Division strung out along the road and vulnerable to renewed 
Chinese attacks. Keiser therefore decided to move his 
division at first light, and endure another night of battle 
with the Chinese from his present position.
The Chinese were not slow to press their advantage. As 
darkness again shrouded the battlefield of the Chongchon 
River, the Chinese army renewed their assault on the Second 
Infantry Division. Shortly after midnight on the night of 
November 27/28 the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment, heavily 
damaged and scheduled to be withdrawn into division reserve 
on the morrow, found itself assailed by at least a full 
division of Chinese. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 9th 
Regiment held their ground, although the 3rd's command post 
was overrun. After an hour of heavy fighting, the 1st 
Battalion was knocked backward and, under intense enemy 
pressure, retreated eastward across the Chongchon River.30
The 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry at this time 
barely existed except on paper. Its rifle "companies” were 
by this time hardly stronger than a normal sized platoon, 
and it is small wonder that this decimated battalion was 
forced backward. The wonder is how it was able to fight at 
all, considering its grievous losses over the past three 
days.
PFC Robert B. Bruce had been reunited with the remnants 
of the 1st Battalion just before nightfall, and thus found
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himself once more wading the icy waters of the Chongchon 
River. Bruce's wounded hands were bleeding again and had 
become infected. His head was still pounding and his ears 
ringing from the effects of the grenade blast two nights 
earlier, and he had lost feeling in his feet due to "mild" 
frostbite suffered in his countless trips across the 
Chongchon River. Bruce had not been evacuated out because 
the battered 9th Infantry Regiment needed every man it could 
muster. The regiment was supposed to go into reserve soon, 
and until that time every man who could carry a rifle was 
needed on the line.31
The more seriously wounded men of the Second Infantry 
Division were sent to the 8076th MASH (Mobile Army Surgical 
Hospital), which was set up near the crossroads at Kunu-ri. 
By November 27th 1950, the large numbers of wounded men from 
the Second Infantry Division were beginning to overwhelm the 
staff of the 8076th. In addition the temperature dropped 
precipitously on the night of November 27th, and the bitter 
cold greatly hampered the medical staff. Intravenous 
solutions froze solid. Space heaters burned out from 
overuse. The water nurses boiled to sterilize surgical 
instruments had ice forming in it before they could finish 
washing them.32
All through the day of November 27th, the doctors and 
nurses of the 8076th worked on the broken bodies of the men
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of the Second Infantry Division. Surgeons were seen warming 
their freezing hands over the steam rising from fresh 
incisions. Soon after dark the generator providing 
electricity to the operating room broke down, forcing the 
surgeons to work by flashlight. And so they did, on through 
the night of November 27th as casualties continued to pour 
in.33
Added to the hazards that the cold weather placed on 
the men of the Second Infantry Division was the strain of 
the round-the-clock nature of the battle, whereby Chinese 
units would attack at night and then the Second Infantry 
Division would regroup and counter-attack during the day.
By the evening of November 27th 1950, the men of the Second 
Infantry Division had been fighting for three days and two 
nights with hardly more than a few hours pause to rest, all 
while engaging an enemy who possessed overwhelming numerical 
superiority. "As the days wore on" recalled Sergeant Robert 
Hammersmith of the 38th Infantry Regiment, "I don't remember 
hardly getting any sleep at all, just constant continuously 
moving and fighting.1,34
Hammersmith's 38th Infantry Regiment was the most hard 
pressed of any unit in the Second Infantry Division or for 
that matter in the whole Eighth Army. On the night of 
November 27th, elements of the Chinese 42nd Army turned west 
from their breach in the ROK II Corps former positions, and
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struck the 38th Infantry Regiment shortly before 2400 hours 
on November 27th. Another Chinese force, from either the 
4 0th or 3 9th Army, launched heavy attacks on the 3 8th 
Infantry Regiment from the north. Although U.S. Army 
estimates vary, at least one and possibly as many as three 
Chinese divisions took turns striking the 38th Infantry 
Regiment throughout the night of November 27th and into the 
morning hours of November 28th.35
It is difficult to discern exactly which Chinese units 
were attacking the Second Infantry Division at this stage of 
the battle, because the Chinese were shifting large numbers 
of men eastward, so as to exploit the opening in the former 
ROK II Corps position. Four Chinese armies (the 38th, 39th, 
4 0th, and 42nd) were identified in the Second Infantry 
Division zone of operations by November 28th, and elements 
of all these units were either attacking the division or 
moving past its right flank to come around behind it.
This Chinese movement around the right flank of the 
Second Infantry Division, and the simultaneous Chinese 
assaults, were facilitated by the lack of any covering force 
on the right flank of the division. It will be remembered 
that, of all the units transferred to the right flank of 
Eighth Army, only the Turkish Brigade had been ordered to 
move northeast to cover the exposed flank of the Second 
Infantry Division. But this small force had run into a
117
large amount of trouble.
As an early recipient of United States aid under the 
"Truman Doctrine," and as a nation which bordered the Soviet 
Union and was itself a possible target of communist 
aggression, Turkey had both moral and political reasons for 
sending troops to fight in Korea. The Turks sent a 5,000 
man brigade, officially titled the Turkish Army Command 
Force, under the command of Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici. 
The Turks were equipped with U.S. weapons and transported to 
Korea. They arrived at the South Korean port of Pusan on 
October 18, 1950.36
Although a hand-picked force, the Turkish Brigade was 
green to combat. Turkey had not fought a war since 192 3 
and, with a few notable exceptions, none of the men in the 
Turkish Brigade had been in battle. Their brief one month 
in Korea had been spent mainly in shuttling from one place 
to another without ever getting into the fighting. That was 
all about to change.37
The Turks were alerted for possible action on the night 
of November 2 6th, when Eighth Army headquarters first 
learned of the collapse of the ROK II Corps. The Turkish 
Brigade was ordered to move northeast to the village of 
Wawon that night, and then resume its advance the following 
day (27th) by moving further north retaking the village of 
Tokchon, and join up with the Second Infantry Division. The
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Turkish commander Brigadier General Yazici recalled:
Further intelligence was asked for about the enemy 
and the ROK corps, but none was available: or more 
information was not supplied lest it lower the 
morale of the Turkish Brigade.38
Moving north from Wawon along a narrow dirt road the 
Turks encountered large numbers of civilians and South 
Korean soldiers streaming towards the rear. Unknown to the 
Turks, interspersed in the refugee columns were large 
numbers of North Korean guerrillas and Chinese soldiers 
wearing South Korean uniforms. These men filed past the 
Turks, along with the rest of the refugees. Once out of 
sight, they shed their disguises and set up ambush positions 
all along the road up which the Turks had just traveled.39
Chinese infiltration teams and North Korean guerrillas 
were an integral part of the Chinese plan of attack at the 
Battle of the Chongchon River. Not only did these 
guerrillas set up roadblocks behind combat units, they also 
operated far behind the United Nations frontline. At 03 00 
hours on November 28th, 1950, a Chinese biplane dropped a 
string of fragmentation bombs on the U.S. Air Force 8th 
Fighter Bomber Group's parking ramp at Pyongyang Airfield, 
approximately 8 0 miles south of where the Second Infantry 
Division was engaged. The bombs killed one man, destroyed 
three F-bl Mustangs, and damaged eight more. A subsequent 
U.S. Air Force investigation of the incident revealed that
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the uncanny accuracy of the communist aircraft's attack may 
have been due to help from the ground in illuminating the 
target. Six of the "Korean" laborers employed at the base 
turned out to be Chinese, one of whom was positively 
identified as an officer in the Chinese Communist Forces.40
As the Turkish Brigade moved north, a U.S. observation 
aircraft detected a large force of Chinese moving southwest 
towards the Turks. Upon receiving this information, Eighth 
Army ordered Yazici to turn his column around and take up a 
defensive position approximately seven miles east of Wawon. 
Yazici misinterpreted this command, and instead ordered his 
Brigade to return to Wawon itself.41
Just turning the column around was a major 
accomplishment for Yazici. The narrow one-lane road his 
brigade was on was flanked by a sheer cliff on one side, and 
a sharply sloping embankment on the other. As a result it 
took several hours to get their trucks and other vehicles 
turned around.42
Much of the Turkish brigade was still on the road when 
darkness fell on November 27th. As it grew dark, the Turks 
began receiving sniper fire from the Chinese infiltrators on 
the hillsides around them. Suddenly the rear of the Turkish 
column was attacked by a large Chinese force, which Yazici 
later estimated at division strength. The Turks fought 
their way back down the road, finally reaching Wawon where
120
they hastily deployed into a defensive perimeter.
When a large force of soldiers suddenly appeared out of 
the darkness, the Turks opened fire and charged the "enemy" 
with fixed bayonets. They took over 100 prisoners and 
killed or wounded hundreds more. Yazici informed Eighth 
Army headquarters that his men had won a great victory and 
sent the prisoners back for interrogation. These prisoners 
turned out to be South Korean soldiers who had been caught 
between the Turks and the advancing Chinese.43
The real Chinese were right on the South Korean's heels 
and soon launched a massive attack on the Turks. Yazici 
later estimated that at least 20,000 Chinese struck his 
brigade that night.44
"They were attacking in hundreds, thousands" stated 
Turkish 2nd Lieutenant Orhan Akpolat, "In truth this is the 
way it was, they were encircling us. It was very difficult 
to break out of their encirclement. The fighting was at 
very close quarters.1,45
The fight was "at very close quarters," because both 
the Chinese and Turks welcomed hand-to-hand fighting. The 
Turks would fire their weapons for awhile before meeting the 
Chinese assault with a bayonet charge of their own. These 
tactics seemed to throw the Chinese off balance, and the 
Turks forced back several Chinese attacks. Gradually, the 
superior numbers of the Chinese began to turn the tide of
121
battle in their favor.
As the Chinese assault waves struck the Turkish lines 
at Wawon, Turkish officers were seen throwing their fur hats 
onto the ground, to mark the spot from which they would 
rather die than retreat. Many Turks did die, but they 
hurled back the Chinese with cold steel. Turkish Private 
Haci Altiner recalled: "How shall I say? We and the Chinese 
suffered enormous casualties. There was so much blood that 
it ran like rivulets in a thunderstorm. That was a great 
battle."46 The Turks held their ground and, as daylight 
came on November 28th, Wawon remained in friendly hands.
The Turkish Brigade, for all its valor, had taken heavy 
casualties; and its position at Wawon was still 10 miles 
southeast of the Second Infantry Division's position near 
Kujang-dong. Through that ten mile wide gap, units of 
General Li Tianyu's CCF XIII Army Group were moving, in an 
attempt to encircle and destroy the Second Infantry 
Division. The Second Division was the sole remaining 
obstacle barring Li's men from their objective of enveloping 
and destroying the Eighth Army.
Once again, EUSAK G-2 was slow to recognize the 
dangerous situation Eighth Army now faced. Its intelligence 
summary for November 27th, 1950, described the Chinese 
assault on the Second Infantry Division and Turks as 
"regimental sized enemy attacks on three fronts (resulting
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in) friendly readjustment of positions." Ominously though, 
EUSAK G—2 concluded its "Enemy Capabilities" report for 
November 27th by estimating that the Chinese and North 
Korean's would "attack south with reinforced forces against 
friendly positions, continue guerilla activity throughout 
EUSAK zone, and be further reinforced by Chinese Communist 
and/or Soviet Forces."47
November 28th
The Second Infantry Division began to assemble in the 
early morning hours of November 28th, 1950 in preparation to 
execute Division Operations Order #11. But the battles of 
November 27th, 1950, had already made the order obsolete 
because most of the positions to which the elements of the 
Second Division were to withdraw to, were now held by 
Chinese forces that had rushed through the breach on the 
right flank. The Second Infantry Division found itself in a 
"cul de sac," with strong Chinese units on three sides which 
were moving to cut across the rear of the division and 
encircle it completely.48
Consequently, Keiser countermanded Operations Order #11 
with Operations Order #12, by which the Second Division 
would execute a fighting withdrawal 15 miles southward to 
the crossroads of Kunu-ri. The 2 3rd Infantry Regiment was 
reinforced with the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
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Regiment to form a task force charged with guarding the rear
of the division as it made its withdrawal. The withdrawal
was complicated by the need of the 38th Infantry Regiment to
withdraw three miles west along its narrow supply road,
before it could move south down the main valley road. As a
result, the division's rearguard had to hold a forward
position north of Ku j ang-dong.49
The tremendous traffic load was too much to be
accommodated by the two lane gravel road that served as the
main "highway" in the Chongchon River valley and traffic
"was often literally solid from Kujang-dong to Kunu-ri."50
The rearguard during the Second Division's withdrawal
to Kunu-ri consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd
Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Infantry
Regiment. The 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment set up a
blocking position behind the 1st Battalion of the 2 3rd,
after which the 1st would "leap-frog" that unit to establish
another position further down the road. In this manner,
these units would guard the rear of the column as it slowly
traveled southward. Captain Sherman W. Pratt, who commanded
"Baker" Company, 1st Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, later
recalled the appearance of the men of the Second Infantry
Division who retreated past his rearguard position:
Their appearance attested to the severity of the 
fighting in which they had been engaged now for 
almost three days. They were all dirty, unshaven,
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weary looking beyond description and with blank
expressions on hollow and gaunt faces.51
The Chinese followed the retreating Second Infantry 
Division closely, sniping at the column from the hills, 
firing mortar shells at it, and occasionally even launching 
small assaults on its rearguard. Pratt walked among his 
soldiers in their rearguard positions and tried to keep 
their spirits up. As he made his rounds Pratt spied a 
soldier, whom he remembered only as "Ernie," and whom he had 
last seen fighting off a large group of Chinese the night 
before. Noticing the depressed look in the man's face,
Pratt said "Cheer up Ernie! We'll get out of this okay." 
Ernie replied "Wish I could believe that, Captain, but I 
doubt if you very much believe it yourself." "You're right" 
Pratt replied "It's a dark hour just now." Ernie was killed 
later that night by a Chinese hand grenade.52
The narrow road along the Chongchon River became so 
clogged with the vehicles of the Second Infantry Division, 
that total gridlock soon ensued. The column moved so slowly 
that most of the division had yet to cover the 15 miles to 
Kunu-ri before darkness fell on November 28th. It was after 
midnight before all of the Second Division's units were able 
deploy into their assigned positions.
On November 28th, the rest of the Eighth Army was 
withdrawing in the west under light enemy pressure. Many of
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its units had yet to see any action against the enemy, as
the main Chinese offensive was still striking the Eighth
Army's right flank held by the U.S. Second Infantry
Division. On the left flank of the Eighth Army was the
crack ROK 1st Division, which was commanded by General Paik
Sun Yup. Paik later recalled:
Most of my officers and men were bewildered that 
the mighty ROK 1st Division was withdrawing 
without a single slugfest worthy of the name. We 
crossed the Chongchon River [at its mouth] heading 
south on November 28, 1950. It was snowing.53
While the entire Eighth Army moved south on November
28th, an event occurred that was completely overlooked at
the time, yet would have terrifying consequences later.
Roadblock at Samso-ri
The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had been ordered by 
Eighth Army to move into position alongside the ROK 6th 
Division near Pukchang-ni. Before deploying his division, 
Major General Gay ordered the 5th Cavalry Regiment to move 
south from the village of Kaechon to Sunchon, to rejoin the 
rest of the 1st Cavalry Division.54
The 5th Cavalry Regiment headed south on the morning of 
November 28th, but after moving approximately six miles the 
lead elements of the regiment were ambushed near the village 
of Samso-ri. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of 
the regiment was cut to pieces by enemy automatic weapons
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fire, with only the platoon sergeant and three other men 
escaping. The 5th Cavalry rushed its 2nd battalion forward 
and attacked down both sides of the road, but failed to 
dislodge the Chinese holding the high ground.55
After the initial skirmishing, the Americans realized 
that the enemy soldiers facing them were not North Korean 
guerrillas but Chinese soldiers who held the road in force. 
After several probes by the 5th Cavalry failed to dislodge 
the enemy, its commander decided to bypass the roadblock by 
moving several miles west before turning south towards 
Sunchon. After many hours, the 5th Cavalry Regiment finally 
reached its destination of Sunchon well after dark on the 
night of November 28th.56
A Chinese force, large enough to stop an entire fresh 
and full strength U.S. Army regiment, had established a 
roadblock at Samso-ri, ,just three miles east of the Second 
Infantry Division's main supply route and ten miles south of 
where the division was deploying for battle. Yet there is 
no record that the Second Division was ever notified of this 
development. Thus Major General Laurence Keiser's attention 
remained focused on his front and dangling right flank, 
while powerful Chinese forces were establishing themselves 
behind his positions.
As its units filed in on the night of November 28th, 
the Second Infantry Division formed a defensive arc north of
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the village of Kunu-ri. The left flank of the Second 
Division was held by the remnants of the 9th Infantry
Regiment and the center by the 2 3rd Infantry Regiment. On
the right flank, the ROK 3rd and U.S. 38th Infantry 
Regiments were supposed to deploy on the high ground along 
Piho-san Ridge, a few miles north of Kunu-ri. But upon 
arriving at the ridge, the 38th and ROK 3rd discovered 
powerful Chinese forces had sideslipped past the Second
Division's open right flank and had occupied the ridge in
great strength.57
Consequently, the ROK 3rd and U.S. 3 8th Infantry 
Regiments deployed on the low ground south of Piho-san 
Ridge, where they once again found themselves with a narrow 
east-west road at their backs as their only supply route and 
their only possible route of retreat. On the extreme right 
flank, the Turkish Brigade held the line near the village of 
Kaechon, as it had been assigned directly to the Second 
Infantry Division after its encounter with the Chinese at 
Wawon.58
Once again, on paper, this deployment looked 
formidable, but in the words of the official Second Infantry 
Division history, the units holding the defensive line at 
Kunu-ri on the night of November 28th "bore little 
resemblance to their previous organizations."59 All the 
regiments had experienced severe combat, some for four
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consecutive days and nights. The 9th Infantry Regiment had 
been reduced to one effective battalion (the 2nd) after the 
first night of combat, and that battalion had suffered 
grievous losses during its trial of battle over the 
following three days and nights. The 38th Infantry had 
suffered heavy losses as well, though not as grievous as the 
9th Regiment. Thus Colonel Paul Freeman's 2 3rd Infantry 
Regiment remained the most powerful force left in the Second 
Infantry Division by the evening of November 28th, and for 
this reason, Keiser gave the 23rd Infantry the task of 
holding the Second Division's center.60
From its new positions at Kunu-ri, the Second Infantry 
Division was ordered by Eighth Army headquarters to continue 
its delaying action against the Chinese until other Eighth 
Army units had completed their withdrawal south of the 
Chinese flanking attack.61 Keiser would have preferred that 
the Second Division continue its withdrawal on November 
29th, south to Sunchon where he could form a solid defensive 
line with his right flank anchored by the U.S. 1st Cavalry 
Division. But Lt. General Walton Walker decided otherwise 
and continued to believe the safety of the rest of Eighth 
Army required the Second Division to make a stand at Kunu- 
ri. Walker's views ar^ well expressed by historian Roy 
Appleman: "For compelling reasons the 2nd Division had to be 
stopped in a vulnerable position at Kunu-ri for the benefit
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of the rest of the army."62
On the front and flanks of the Second Infantry 
Division, approximately 5-6 Chinese divisions (50,000-60,000 
men) were massing to try and shatter it, and enable the 
Chinese to intercept the rest of Eighth Army as it was 
retreating southward.63 The men of the Second Infantry 
Division were unaware that they were fighting not just for 
their own lives, but also to buy time for tens of thousands 
of their fellow soldiers in other divisions to disengage and 
form a new defensive line. In war there is only one way to 
buy time, and that is with the blood of your soldiers. It 
is written in the book of the Apostle John that: "No greater 
love hath any man than this. That he lay down his life for 
his friend."64 In those final bitter days of November 1950, 
the soldiers of the Second Infantry Division fought and died
a
so that others might be saved.
Crisis at the Top
While the Second Infantry Division redeployed near the 
crossroads of Kunu-ri, the news of the Chinese intervention 
into the Korean War was being flashed around the world. On 
November 28, 1950, the Supreme Commander of United Nations 
forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, informed 
President Harry Truman that at least 2 00,000 Chinese 
soldiers had entered the Korean War, and were launching a
130
massive offensive against UN forces throughout the whole of
Korea. As a result, MacArthur informed Truman that he had
halted offensive operations, and authorized local
withdrawals. MacArthur's message continued:
All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to 
North Korean troops...can now be completely 
abandoned. The Chinese military forces are 
committed in Korea in great and ever increasing 
strength. We face an entirely new war. It is 
quite evident that our present strength of force 
is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by 
the Chinese.65
Unknown to MacArthur, his army now faced 300,000
Chinese soldiers, 100,000 more than he had reported to
Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.66 This is an
important point, because MacArthur was arguing that "our
present strength of force is not sufficient" to fight
200,000 Chinese. Obviously then, his forces were even less
prepared to do battle with 300,000 Chinese. Thus the
largest American military force deployed anywhere in the
world at that time was in danger of being completely
overwhelmed and destroyed by the Communist Chinese.
Alan Jackson of CBS Radio began his morning broadcast
on November 28th, 1950, with the following news bulletin:
Good morning everybody, although it's not a good 
morning for the United Nations army in Korea, or 
the cause of democracy throughout the world.
General MacArthur has announced a brand new war 
against 200,000 [sic] Chinese Communist troops who 
right now are rolling back American, British,
Turkish, and South Korean forces in the most 
serious U.N. retreat of the war. These
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developments have come with stunning suddenness in 
the past few hours resulting in a communique from 
MacArthur's headquarters which is perhaps the 
gravest document of its kind since World War IX.
It makes news so serious that all other 
developments this morning, storms, domestic 
politics, seem minor indeed in comparison.67
The news from Korea sent Shockwaves through Washington 
and on the afternoon of November 28th, Truman hastily 
convened an emergency meeting of the National Security 
Council. The minutes of that meeting reveal that the 
leading figures of the Truman Administration were confused 
by the sudden turn of events in Korea. Overnight, the 
Truman Administration's policy for waging the Korean War 
changed from a quest for military victory to an effort to 
end the conflict by diplomatic means.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar 
Bradley, opened the meeting with an incredibly optimistic 
briefing on the rapidly deteriorating military situation in 
Korea. Bradley contended that the "reports...about the 
strength and momentum of the Chinese communist offensive 
might well be exaggerated." He went on to say that he 
"doubted that our lines had been breached... and that it was 
entirely possible that the Chinese offensive might not go 
very far because of the extremely difficult terrain...and 
difficult Chinese supply situation.1,68
General Bradley then expressed his estimate that: "The
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Chinese communists have an air potential of at least 3 00
bombers on nearby fields in Manchuria. These bombers could
seriously curtail our airlift (of supplies), and our planes
were jammed so closely on the fields in Korea that surprise
raids could do us very great damage."69 In spite of this
danger to which he had alluded, Bradley said that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff did not believe that MacArthur should be
authorized to bomb airfields in Manchuria. General Bradley
concluded his briefing by reporting that:
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not recommend that 
any additional Reserve components be ordered up 
now. He said that there were no additional troops 
that could be sent to General MacArthur and that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not plan to try and 
send any others. General Bradley said that the 
Joint Chiefs felt just as strongly as the three 
Secretaries [Army, Navy, Air Force] that we should 
not let ourselves be pulled into any war in 
China.70
Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall heartily
concurred with Bradley's opinion on war with China in
asserting that:
he would like to repeat again the point which the 
three Service Secretaries had regarded as the most 
important item in their memorandum, namely, not 
getting ourselves involved individually, or as a 
United Nations matter, in a general war with 
China.71
Vice President Alben Barkley interrupted the discussion 
to launch a rambling attack on General MacArthur, demanding 
to know if MacArthur had really made "the statement 
attributed to him a week ago that the boys in Korea would be
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home by Christmas." "I am going to be asked all kinds of 
questions about this on the Hill", Barkley complained.72
Secretary of State Dean Acheson joined the discussion
and:
asked everyone to remember that the Soviet Union 
had been behind every move. Whatever we think of 
current happenings in Korea must be in the light 
of world events, and the three Secretaries and 
General Marshall were very wise in emphasizing the 
fact that we must not, under any circumstances, 
become involved in a general war with China. Mr. 
Acheson said we must ask ourselves, what do we 
want in Korea? The answer is easy, "We want to 
terminate it". We don't want to beat China in 
Korea,— we can't. We don't want to beat China any 
place— we can't.73
MacArthur was as outraged at the lack of support from 
President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State 
Department, as he was at the Chinese. Years later when 
writing his memoirs, MacArthur expressed the frustration he 
felt at what he considered to be a lack of support by the 
leadership in Washington for his men in Korea. MacArthur 
wrote:
No solution was advanced as to the problem of 
reinforcement but rather toward unrealistically 
expecting the impossible from men who had gone in 
to fight one war [against North Korea], had won 
it, and were now trying to fight a much bigger 
one.74
In regards to whether or not China could be defeated in
Korea, MacArthur would write:
The thought of defeat in Korea had never been 
entertained by me. It was my belief that, if 
allowed to use my full military might, without
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artificial restrictions, I could not only save 
Korea, but also inflict such a destructive blow 
upon Red China's capacity to wage aggressive war 
that it would remove her as a further threat to 
peace in Asia for generations to come.75
The "artificial restrictions" that MacArthur referred
to were the orders from President Truman which prohibited
him from attacking the Chinese mainland, even with only air
or naval forces. MacArthur was only allowed to fight those
Chinese forces which actually entered Korea, while the
Truman Administration maintained the diplomatic fiction that
the United States was engaged in a "police action" in Korea
and was not at war with Communist China.76
War with China had nonetheless already come, whether
Truman or his advisors wanted to admit it or not. While
Truman and his advisors worried over possible Soviet moves
against Europe, and MacArthur ranted over the lack of
support his command was receiving, the men of the United
States Second Infantry Division tried to stay alive for just
one more day.
Eight thousand miles from the council rooms of
Washington, D.C., amidst the frozen wind-swept hills of
Korea, the men of the Second Division prepared for another
day of battle with the Chinese foe. There would be no
relief for these men, only more suffering and more dying.
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CHAPTER V
KUNU-RI 
"If you have a son overseas, write to him.
If you have a son in the Second Division, pray for him*"
Walter Winchell
On November 29, 1950, the U.S. Second Infantry Division 
braced itself for another day of battle amidst the low hills 
south of the crossroads at Kunu-ri. Although the attention 
of the Second Infantry Division was focused on the Chinese 
threat to its front and flanks, large numbers of Chinese 
soldiers were slipping past its open right flank and 
preparing to spring a massive ambush on the division.
In the pre-dawn darkness of November 29, 1950, a 
Turkish convoy carrying supplies for the Turkish Brigade, 
headed north from Sunchon up the main supply road of the 
Second Infantry Division bound for Kunu-ri, a journey of 
approximately seven miles. Along the way, this Turkish 
convoy was ambushed, and lost several men and vehicles. The 
survivors of the ambush pulled into Major General Laurence 
Reiser's Second Infantry Division command post shortly after 
sunrise and in broken English desperately attempted to 
communicate what had happened to them.1
The only thing the Americans could discern from what 
the excited Turks said, was that they had been shot at
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somewhere along the road from Sunchon to Kunu-ri. As the 
remnants of the Turkish supply convoy continued on their way 
towards Kaechon to try and join their Brigade attached to 
the right flank of the Second Infantry Division, Keiser 
ordered a Military Police (MP) platoon to move south and see 
if they could find out exactly what the Turks had 
encountered.2
The MP platoon headed south at 0900 hours on November 
29th, and after proceeding approximately two miles came 
under heavy machinegun and small arms fire. The MPs lost 
four men killed and wounded, before beating a hasty retreat 
back up the road to inform Second Division headquarters that 
there was a roadblock in place on the division's supply 
road. Keiser immediately dispatched the 2nd Reconnaissance 
Company to attack the roadblock and eliminate it. The 2nd 
Reconnaissance Company attacked the roadblock at 1000 hours 
but failed to make any headway.3
The enemy forces holding the road were ascertained to 
be Chinese, and the roadblock was actually discovered to be 
a "fireblock" of Chinese with automatic weapons entrenched 
on both sides of the road. Even though no physical 
obstruction appeared to block the road far larger numbers of 
Chinese were present than the Americans had anticipated.
At 1240 hours, Keiser reinforced the 2nd Reconnaissance 
Company with Company C of the 38th Infantry Regiment and a
tank platoon from the 72nd Tank Battalion and ordered this 
task force to destroy the enemy roadblock. But this attack 
failed as well, and Second Division headquarters' estimate 
enemy strength at the roadblock was now raised from a few
i
dozen men to a reinforced company of approximately 300 men.4
Keiser next ordered a battery of 155-mm howitzers from 
the 503rd Field Artillery to give supporting fire to the 
task force attempting to eliminate the roadblock. Even with 
this additional support the task force still could not 
dislodge the Chinese from their entrenched positions on the 
high ground overlooking the road.5
Keiser grew increasingly frustrated with what he 
considered to be a nuisance in his division's rear area, but 
considered it to be no more than that. Of far greater 
concern to him were the large formations of Chinese moving 
down the Chongchon valley to his front and massing in the 
hills and valleys on his flanks.
Exactly how many Chinese attacked the Second Infantry 
Division on November 29th, 1950, and to which units they 
belonged, is difficult to ascertain. The Chinese shifted 
many divisions from their initial battle deployment in order 
to concentrate their forces against the open right flank of 
the Second Infantry Division. Chinese units first 
identified by the Second Division to be on its front had now 
redeployed on its right, and fresh Chinese units had moved
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eastward into the division's zone of operations as the 
remainder of Eighth Army in the west disengaged and 
withdrew.
From the prisoner interrogation reports filed by Eighth
Army Intelligence at the time of the battle, and from
captured Chinese documents reproduced in official U.S. Army
histories, I have been able to determine the Chinese order
of battle facing the Second Infantry Division when night
fell on November 29, 1950:
On the left flank and left center: two divisions 
from the CCF 39th Army
In the center: entire CCF 4 0th Army (118th, 119th, 
and 120th Divisions)
On the right flank: 112th and 114th Divisions of 
the CCF 38th Army
Holding roadblock on Second Division's supply 
road: 113th Division, CCF 38th Army.6
Taking into account the probable casualties suffered by 
the Chinese in the previous four days and nights of battle, 
the total strength of Chinese forces opposing the Second 
Infantry Division for the final two days of the Battle of 
the Chongchon River was approximately 65,000 men. This is 
5,000 more men than both MacArthur's Intelligence and EUSAK 
G-2 had estimated China had throughout the whole of Korea, 
when the UN offensive had began on November 24th.7
Across the south end of the Chongchon valley the United 
States Second Infantry Division deployed for battle. Given
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enough time, the Second Division could have dug into the 
hills south of Kunu-ri, and possibly turned back the 
onrushing Chinese. But time was something that Li Tianyu's 
Chinese XIII Army Group would not allow the Americans to 
have. Determined to press his advantage, Li ordered his men 
to continue their attacks and their pursuit of the 
withdrawing Second Division during the daylight hours of 
November 29th.
Smoke screens were laid down by the advancing Chinese 
to mask their troop movements. Once again, the forests of 
Korea burned as the Dragon moved. Through brief openings in 
the haze, aerial observers reported entire Chinese regiments 
"dog-trotting" down the roads and valley floors on the east 
flank of the Second Infantry Division. Air strikes were 
called in, but the Chinese quickly disappeared into the 
haze. The air strikes themselves set more fires and 
generated yet more smoke, furthering hampering U.S. air 
support.8
By late afternoon the Chinese fireblock was still in 
place on the Second Division's main supply road, and both 
Keiser and his regimental commanders were beginning to worry 
about this threat.
At 1445 hours Colonel George Peploe, commanding the 
3 8th Infantry Regiment, radioed Keiser's headquarters 
requesting permission to evacuate his supply trains and aid
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station through Kunu-ri southward to Sunchon. Peploe was
"informed that roadblock not cleared and to remain in
position until given word. Periodic checks should be made
every hour."9
At 1528 hours, Peploe again radioed in "Can we go
through to Sunchon yet? We have a lot of wounded." The G-3
(Operations) officer of the Second Infantry Division, Lt.
Colonel Maurice Holden, informed Peploe that his supply
trains and wounded would be diverted west "through Anju and
then Sinanju, where a MASH Hospital and air evacuation
facilities are located. The roadblock is still in."10
At 163 0 hours, Major General Keiser sent a message
requesting assistance to Major General John Coulter, the
commanding general of the IX Corps. It marked the first
time in the Battle of the Chongchon River that the Second
Infantry Division actually requested reinforcements.
Reiser's message stated:
Serious roadblock to South. Estimated enemy 
battalion or more. Air strikes, artillery, and 
Infantry Company attacks have failed. Road jammed 
with vehicles prevents movement North or South.
Request immediate assistance from the South to 
relieve situation. Please notify action taken as 
all infantry elements definitely engaged.11
The function of the American corps commanders in the
Battle of the Chongchon River was almost purely
administrative, as they were concerned mainly with
coordinating movements of troops and supplies rather than
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making tactical decisions in combat. But if the Second 
Infantry Division was to be reinforced, it would have to be 
by the authority of either IX Corps or, further up the chain 
of command, Eighth Army.
Since Lieutenant General Walton Walker had reinforced 
IX Corps, Coulter had units available that could assist the 
Second Division. Accordingly IX Corps informed Keiser that 
a battalion from the British Commonwealth 27th Brigade, 
would attack north from Sunchon on the morning of November 
3 0th. Simultaneously the Second Division was to drive 
south to join the 2 7th Brigade in eliminating the Chinese 
roadblock.12
At approximately 1700 hours on November 29th, while the 
Second Division's task force was still attacking the Chinese 
fireblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, Lieutenant General 
Walton Walker ordered the entire Eighth Army to fall back to 
a new defensive position. The Second Infantry Division was 
ordered to abandon Kunu-ri, and retreat 20 miles south to 
Sunchon. Only minutes before Walker made this decision, the 
lead elements of the CCF 3 8th Army emerged from the smoke 
filled valleys in the east, and attacked the Second Infantry 
Division's right flank, held by the 3 8th Infantry Regiment 
and the Turkish Brigade near the village of Kaechon.13
The CCF 38th Army hit the 3 8th Regiment's 3rd Battalion 
head on, then sent strong columns wheeling westward and
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southward around the Turkish Brigade at Kaechon. The Turks 
immediately opened fire on the Chinese, but the Chinese had 
no intention of assaulting Kaechon. While Chinese mortar 
fire crashed into Kaechon, pinning the Turks down, Chinese 
units in regimental strength swung south around Kaechon, and 
then headed northwest, grabbing a hill mass that dominated 
the supply road of the 3 8th Infantry Regiment and the 
Turkish Brigade.14
Colonel George Peploe's worst nightmare had come true. 
For the entire battle Peploe's 38th Infantry Regiment had 
been forced to use for both supply and withdrawal, narrow 
roads that ran parallel to his frontline. The threat of a 
Chinese penetration of his lines that might result in a 
severing of his regimental supply road, had been foremost in 
Peploe's mind.15
Now the Chinese forces had severed this line and held 
the road connecting the 38th Regiment and Turkish Brigade to 
the rest of the Second Infantry Division. No sooner had 
Peploe learned this, than he found the entire Turkish 
Brigade retreating west out of Kaechon and clogging the road 
with its vehicles. Attempts by Keiser and Peploe to contact 
Brigadier General Yazitii over the radio failed, and no one 
seemed to know the whereabouts of his headquarters.16
Unknown to the Second Infantry Division, Yazici, after 
seeing that his position was flanked, had ordered the
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Turkish Brigade to withdraw west before the Chinese 
completely cut the 38th Regiment's supply road. Then Yazici 
and his staff drove off, running by the Chinese in the hills 
and apparently driving past Reiser's Second Infantry 
Division command post later that evening. When Yazici 
disappeared, the Turks were left leaderless and they soon 
became a disorganized mass retreating west down the road.17
The heavy Chinese attacks on the 38th Infantry Regiment 
prompted General Keiser to issue new orders to Peploe, 
commanding him to withdraw west to Kunu-ri. Under heavy 
attack, Peploe attempted to withdraw his units as best he 
could. Peploe's movement was made infinitely more 
complicated by the unauthorized withdrawal of the Turkish 
Brigade, and by the fact that large numbers of Chinese had 
already established firing positions overlooking the 
wi thdr awa 1 route.18
Captain Reginald Hinton dispatched two tanks from his 
regimental tank company to guard the 38th Infantry 
Regiment's artillery pieces until they could safely 
withdraw.19
Commanding one of these M4A3E8 Sherman tanks was 
Sergeant First Class Robert Sevy, and he and his tank driver 
Corporal James Scoon have vivid memories of that night of 
November 29, 1950. Assigned to guard the regimental
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artillery, Sevy and Scoon had no sooner arrived and taken up 
positions east of the guns, than the artillerymen hooked up 
their guns to their trailers and withdrew, never telling the 
tankers that they were leaving. By the time the tankers 
realized that the artillerymen had left, large numbers of 
Chinese were deploying along the ridges that dominated the 
narrow dirt road that the tanks were on.20
Gunning his engine, Scoon drove his Sherman west down 
the road, falling in behind a battalion of Turkish soldiers 
who were in trucks and jeeps and also retreating. But upon 
reaching a point where the road went through a narrow pass, 
the column was brought to a halt. Chinese forces held both 
sides of the pass in great strength and were delivering 
deadly machinegun and mortar fire onto the clogged road.
The Turkish soldiers apparently panicked at this point and 
abandoned their vehicles on the road.21
Sevy and Scoon found their tank stuck in the "log jam" 
of vehicles, east of ttie pass. To their front was the 
abandoned column of Turkish vehicles. Behind them was the 
other tank in their platoon as well as advancing units of 
the Chinese 38th Army. Somewhere further up the road, 
caught up in the Turkish vehicles, were the other tanks of 
their company. On the tankers right was a sheer cliff 
dropping down nearly forty feet to a dry wash, and to their 
left was another cliff rising forty to fifty feet above
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them, and literally swarming with Chinese. Sevy and Scoon
would spend the entire night of November 29th, 1950 in this
precarious position. Sevy recalled:
We really caught hell that night boy! They 
[Chinese] were throwing white phosphorous grenades 
on top of the tank, off of the cliff above us, and 
the bugles and everything going, and just a 
horrendous thing. Them old seals on those hatches 
wasn't no damn good on those wore out World War II 
tanks, and I looked down at the drivers seat and 
Jim [Scoon] was a sitting down there just glowing.
And I said; 'Jim you better get them goddamn 
clothes off and throw them out because you got 
white phosphorous all over you. /22
At the west end of the road, Captain Hinton recalled
watching the Turkish Brigade come spilling out of the pass
late on the night of November 29th:
I had tanks up this valley and they got stuck up 
in there because the Turks bugged out. I don't 
mind saying that because I was there. Nobody said 
anything about it at the time because it was an 
international operation and they didn't want to 
degrade anybody. Bullshit! They bugged! Jim 
Nabors [one of Hinton's officers] and I stood on 
the road and they were running out of that valley 
like a crowd coming out of a football stadium. We 
found an officer with them, and we knew he spoke 
English because he had been in the command post 
earlier. And we stopped him and told him to help 
us get them [the Turks] turned around. He said 'I 
have no command authority, I'm an adjutant!', and 
off he went. So they abandoned their artillery, 
their trucks, everything up in this narrow valley, 
and nothing could get out of there.23
This description of the Turkish Brigade completely
contradicts the first American reports of its courageous
stand at Wawon, and brings up a subject of some controversy
in writings both on the Battle of the Chongchon River in
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particular and the Korean War in general.
Billy Mossman, the official Army historian of this
phase of the Korean War, and military historian Clay Blair
in his book The Forgotten War, offer extremely negative
views of the performance of the Turkish troops and their
commander. S.L.A. Marshall and Roy Appleman have a somewhat
neutral opinion on the Turks fighting abilities, while T.R.
Fehrenbach, a rifle company commander in the Second Infantry
Division at the battle/ heaps laudatory praise on the
brigade in his book This Kind of War. Major General Warren
Hodges served as the 3 8th Infantry Regiment's operations
officer during the Battle of the Chongchon River, and he
sheds some light on the controversy:
I got all kinds of reports at the time. Ones that 
said they were great fighters and ones that said 
they weren't worth a damn. I know that later on 
[in his career] I observed the Turkish Army, and I 
found out they were typical of most of those 
countries over there [Middle East]. There's no 
initiative. If they're not told what to do, they 
don't usually know what to do. I think if they 
are well led they are damn good fighters, and 
brother as individuals they are as bloodthirsty as 
they come. But it's the leadership that they 
need.24
On the basis of Hodge's testimony and other eyewitness 
accounts of the Turks fighting abilities, it would appear 
that the main cause of the Turkish Brigade's poor 
performance on the night of November 29, 1950, was the 
absence of its commander, Brigadier General Yazici, who had
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inexplicably abandoned his brigade at this critical moment 
of the battle.
Hinton, who remained concerned about his tank crews 
still stuck on the road, desperately attempted to reach them 
on the radio from his command jeep. But because of the 
mountainous terrain, he had trouble radioing them and was 
obliged to drive his jeep up to the entrance of the valley 
in order to communicate.25
Hinton had a SCR 503 radio designed for use inside a 
tank. Consequently the console of the radio had two large 
lights on the front. When one turned on the radio a blue 
light lit up; and when one depressed a button to speak into 
the transmitter, a red light came on as well. In the 
darkness of the battlefield that night, the lights from the 
radio brought unwelcome attention to Hinton from the nearby 
Chinese, who would open fire when they saw the lights come 
on. "Everytime I had to go over to that jeep," Hinton
recalled, "I was scared to death, because those lightbulbs 
made it just like daylight over there." Hinton informed 
Lieutenant William "Sam" Mace of his dilemma and, after a 
moment of thought, Mace calmly walked over to the radio and 
unscrewed the light bulbs.26
Meanwhile, the trapped tankers were literally swarmed 
over by Chinese infantry. Chinese soldiers actually leaped 
onto the decks and turrets of the tanks, in order to try to
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place explosive charges or throw grenades down an open 
hatch. Tankers took turns spraying each other's tanks with 
machinegun fire to knock the Chinese off. Jim Scoon 
remembered:
There was one miserable son of a bitch got on my 
tank above the drivers hatch, and I had my 
periscope up, and he kept stomping it out. And I 
finally got pissed off at him, took my .45 
[pistol] and opened a little hatch and boomI Then 
he didn't stomp anymore.27
As Hinton's tankers tried to fight their way out of the 
trap they had been caught in, Keiser ordered the task force 
he had organized to eliminate the main Chinese roadblock on 
the Second Division's supply road, to halt their attacks.
The task force had made no headway whatsoever and the men 
were exhausted. Keiser decided to reinforce the task force 
the following morning and renew the attack then, preparatory 
to moving the entire Second Infantry Division southward down 
the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road.28
Just after the first Chinese units struck the 38th 
Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Brigade, Reiser's 
headquarters received a message from the Second Infantry 
Division's Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Loyal M. 
Haynes, concerning the proposed withdrawal south. Due to 
the Chinese roadblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, Haynes 
requested permission to withdraw his guns west to Anju and 
then south to Sunchon, thus avoiding the block. This
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request was denied by the Second Division's chief of staff, 
Colonel Gerald C. Epley, on the grounds that the Anju - 
Sunchon road was assigned to I Corps, and as such was off 
limits to the Second Infantry Division. Epley did so in 
spite of the fact that the 807 6th MASH and other service 
units of the Second Infantry Division had already withdrawn 
that way to avoid the Chinese.29
At 17 3 0 hours Keiser ordered the 2 3rd Infantry Regiment 
to withdraw from its position at Kunu-ri and take up a new 
defensive position in the hills south of the town. Captain 
Sherman Pratt commanding Baker Company of the 2 3rd Infantry 
recalled:
We had been in constant combat for almost a week 
without any letup or rest, and most of my men were 
on the verge of complete collapse. Many were 
little more than walking zombies. I ordered the 
company to move out. 'Off and on,' I announced—  
off their butts and on the road in the military 
colloquial of the [time]. Our column began its 
climb, slowly, cautiously, and with enormous 
effort. It was dark, cold, and windy, and we had 
no idea what the high hill had in store for us.30
The fact that 2 3rd Infantry Regiment was the strongest
and freshest unit in the Second Infantry Division on the
night of November 29, 1950, says much about the condition of
the rest of the division.
Keiser and his headquarters staff were still trying to
figure out a plan for the Second Division's withdrawal when,
at 2 02 0 hours, Chinese mortar fire began landing on his
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command post. Soon the tell-tale "brrrrp" of Chinese sub- 
machineguns were heard in the compound, as Chinese 
infiltration teams attacked Keiser's headquarters.31
In the midst of this swirling firefight, radio 
transmissions continued to arrive at headquarters from the 
Second Division's artillery, requesting permission to 
withdraw that night rather than waiting until morning and to 
use the I Corps road through Anju to reach Sunchon rather 
than the blocked Second Division main supply road. Keiser's 
headquarters angrily shot back: "Request to move 17th FA BN 
(field artillery battalion) by alternate route through Anju 
disapproved. Second request to displace the 15th and 3 8th 
FA BNs also disapproved. Div Commander has ordered that all 
units stay in position and fight it out."32 The strain of 
almost a week of constant battle was beginning to show.
Reiser's headquarters staff, supported by the 2nd 
Reconnaissance Company and a battery of guns from the 82nd 
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons (AAA AW) succeeded 
in driving back the Chinese infantry, but enemy mortar fire 
continued to land sporadically on the Second Division's 
command post. Amidst this intermittent shelling, Keiser and 
his staff worked feverishly through the night attempting to 
formulate a withdrawal plan. Sometime during the night 
while these plans were being formulated, Keiser received a 
radio transmission from I Corps commander Major General
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Frank Milburn.
Milburn: How are things going?
Keiser; Bad, right now. We're getting hit in my
CP.
Milburn; Well, come on out my way.33
"My way" meant the I Corps main supply road which ran 
south from Anju to Sunchon. This was the road that the 
Second Division's artillery commander had been radioing in 
requests all that night to use. Milburn and Keiser were 
good friends, and so Milburn's offer was purely personal 
because he lacked the authority to actually authorize the 
move. Any such maneuver by Keiser that would involve moving 
his division out of the IX Corps area of operations and into 
I Corps' area would need clearance from IX Corps commander 
Major General John Coulter.
According to the Second Infantry Division's War Diary, 
sometime during the night of November 29th the Second 
Division initiated a request to IX Corps for authorization 
to move units down the Kunu-ri - Sinanju road, into I Corps' 
sector.34 There is no record that IX Corps ever acted on 
this request.
The plan that Keiser and his headquarters staff finally 
arrived at called for the previously formed task force of 
Company C, 38th Infantry Regiment and tank platoons of the 
72nd Tank Battalion to be reinforced by the entire 9th 
Infantry Regiment. This force would be supported by the
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Second Division artillery and would drive south to eliminate 
the Chinese roadblock on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, thus 
clearing a path for the Second Infantry Division to withdraw
down. By this time the 9th Infantry Regiment was a
"regiment" in name only.
Colonel Charles Sloane's 9th Infantry Regiment had 
begun the Battle of the Chongchon River with approximately
2,800 soldiers. By the night of November 29, 1950, Sloane
could only muster approximately 400 dazed and exhausted men. 
When Sloane was summoned to Keiser's headquarters and handed 
his assignment, he brought this fact to the attention of 
Keiser and his staff, but they were not too concerned.35
Keiser and his staff assured Sloane that the Chinese 
fireblock was shallow and lightly held, and they promised 
that his regiment would be reinforced with tanks as well as 
receive both air and artillery support. With this assurance 
Sloane accepted his assignment, and left to prepare his men 
for the job ahead.36
Despite the inability of the Second Division to remove 
the Chinese from the high ground along its proposed 
withdrawal route, Keiser apparently remained convinced that 
this enemy force in his rear was not a serious threat. 
Overwhelming numbers of Chinese were pressing his division 
on three sides, and the threat posed by any infiltration 
force on his rear was decided to be minor compared to the
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danger threatening the division in other sectors of the 
front.37
Meanwhile Captain Reginald Hinton's tankers were still 
under close attack by surrounding Chinese infantry and were 
trying to find a way out of their predicament on the Kaechon 
- Kunu-ri road. By the early morning hours of November 
3 0th, Hinton still had two tank platoons stuck on the road 
and blocked from further movement by the wrecked and 
abandoned Turkish vehicles in front of them. When the first 
rays of dawn gave Hinton's men enough light to see what they 
were doing, Corporal Jim Scoon decided that the best way out 
was to try and smash through the abandoned Turkish 
vehicles.38 Shifting the big Sherman into low gear, with 
his tank commander Sergeant First Class Bob Sevy in the 
turret giving directions, Scoon moved the tank up against 
the first truck in front of them, and pushed it over the 
edge of the road and down the steep drop to the right.
Scoon continued on down the road, shoving the abandoned 
trucks and jeeps right over the side, until he finally came 
up against something that wouldn't budge.39
That "something" turned out to be the remains of a tank 
that the Chinese had been able to destroy in their close 
assaults of the past few hours. Unable to proceed any 
further, Sevy and Scoon started to wonder if they were ever 
going to get out of this mess alive.40
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A worried Captain Hinton finally received a message
that Sergeant Perrone in one of the trapped tanks had found
a place where he thought the tanks could slide down the
sharp drop on their right, and then drive out through a dry
wash. Hinton radioed back "For God's sake you might as well
try it, even if you tip the tank over, because you can't sit
there!" After a short-while Hinton's radio crackled again:
"Perrone is down with that tank, and we are going to follow
him out." Recalled SFC Bob Sevy:
We looked the situation over [and] we decided we 
was going right over the side of the hill. And it 
was purt near straight down. We unloaded the crew 
and turned the big gun around and Jim, good ol'
Jim [tank driver Jim Scoon] he got in there and 
drove it right over the side, and when she hit 
bottom boy she just went "Kawop!" We got back in 
the tank and started up the [draw], making our way 
back to where we thought the line was. I mean we 
had no idea because we were completely lost and we 
were the only few out there, just two tanks.41
As the morning of November 30th dawned, the skies were
cloudy and there was a hint of snow in the air. Unknown to
the men of the Second Infantry Division, the Chinese were
already in ambush position along the division's withdrawal
route to Sunchon. The men of the Second Infantry Division
had one final horror to endure before their battle would be
over. That horror awaited them along a one-lane gravel road
which wound south through a narrow valley, and into the jaws
of the Dragon.
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CHAPTER VI
IN THE JAWS OF THE DRAGON
"That road wound through a valley of sorrows.
The God of Death himself hovered over that road, 
with heavy, beating wings."
General Paik Sun Yup
As the first rays of sunlight began to penetrate the 
early morning mist of November 30, 1950, the men of the 
United States Second Infantry Division mounted up on tanks, 
jeeps, and trucks and began to roll south from Kunu-ri 
towards Sunchon. The Second Infantry Division was the last 
unit in the Eighth Army still engaged in combat with the 
Chinese, and was finally being ordered by Eighth Army 
commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker to move south to 
safety. Major General Laurence Keiser assigned his 2 3rd 
Infantry Regiment the usually hazardous job of serving as 
rear guard for the Second Division as it withdrew. As the 
men of the 2 3rd Regiment watched their comrades move out, 
they had no idea that this time, their assignment would save 
many of their lives.
As the Second Infantry Division prepared to make its 
withdrawal, Keiser ordered the 3 8th Infantry Regiment to 
assist the remnants of the 9th Regiment in clearing the road 
to the south. Captain Reginald Hinton, who commanded the 
Tank Company of the 3 8th Regiment, recalled:
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We arrived on the main road, and halted at the top 
of a hill. We could see fire coming from the top 
of the next hill to our front which overlooked the 
road which wound through the valley below.
Suddenly, General Keiser appeared. He came up to 
my tank and told me that the 9th Regiment was 
trying to reduce the enemy occupying the hill 
overlooking our withdrawal route. He then asked 
me if I thought I could run through what he 
described as a roadblock. I replied that my 
tankers had been running one roadblock after 
another and could not see why we could not take on 
one more. It was my understanding at the time, 
that this so called road block was only a few 
yards deep. I was then told that the plan was for 
the 9th Infantry to continue its attack, while my 
Tank Company would spearhead the column composed 
of the rest of the Second Division, which would 
barrel down the road and run through the block.1
Riding aboard Hinton's lead tank was Lieutenant Charley
Heath. Heath was attached to Headquarters Company of the
3 8th Regiment. Coming out of Kunu-ri though Heath, like
others, found the best ride available. Heath clambered
aboard Lieutenant William "Sam*' Mace's Sherman tank.
Clinging to the sides of the big tank, Heath stared
anxiously at the bleak hills rising ever more precipitously
on either side of the road. The area of the previous
night's firefight was reached, and the lead units in the
column halted and deployed for battle. Amazingly though,
little resistance was offered by the few Chinese seen. A
wave of relief swept through the ranks, as word was quickly
passed that the block was clear. The infantry rapidly
remounted their vehicles, and the long column once again
began snaking its way forward.2
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As Heath's tank rounded a sharp bend in the road, 
however, they came upon a group of wrecked vehicles. The 
great column came grinding to a halt. While men cursed, and 
drivers blared their horns, Heath and his fellow travellers 
on the tank dismounted and moved towards the wrecked 
vehicles. The vehicles were badly shot up, and as Heath 
walked towards a large truck he saw a body. The blood on 
the man was dark, and coagulated, ice forming on his open 
wounds. As Heath neared the man, he saw he was still alive. 
"Me Turk, me Turk,” the man mumbled. As cold as he was at 
that moment, Heath still felt an icy chill sweep down his 
spine. The Turkish convoy had reported being ambushed, but 
they had already passed that point on the road several miles 
back. What the Turks had failed to communicate, was that 
they had actually been ambushed twice on this same stretch 
of road. That meant that the roadblock was neither shallow 
nor lightly defended.3
The Second Infantry Division had unwittingly driven 
headlong into a Chinese trap. The entire Chinese 113th 
Division had side-slipped past the open right flank of the 
Second Division, and gotten into position along its 
withdrawal route south.4 What had been thought to be a 
shallow roadblock several hundred yards deep, was instead a 
gauntlet of fire stretching for six miles along both sides 
of the road.
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As Heath's mind began to race, the ghastly cacophony of
bugles blasted across the narrow valley, and Chinese
machinegunners concealed on either side of the road opened
fire at near point blank range into the halted column.
Trucks filled with men disintegrated under the concentrated
fire, bursting into flame. Soon the narrow road was clogged
with burning and disabled vehicles, as men dove for the
cover of drainage ditches. Some men ran, others turned and
fought back. Either way, the Chinese gunners killed hero
and coward alike with their deadly fire. The Second
Division's officers soon lost contact with their troops, and
in that frightful situation it became a matter of every man
for himself. Heath scrambled back aboard his tank, just as
the driver gunned the engine and flattened the disabled jeep
which blocked their path. Heath and his fellow riders swept
down the road and cleared the ambush without losing a man.
They would be the lucky ones.5
Captain Reginald Hinton, further back in the column,
was soon on the radio, calling for air strikes to be laid
down on both sides of the road.
Fortunately the 38th Infantry S-3 Air Officer was 
back in the column someplace and picked up this 
request. The air response came quickly. These 
aircraft were P-51's [sic] and strafed at low, and 
I mean low, level. This succeeded in suppressing 
the Chinese for a little while. The column began 
moving again, although at an agonizingly slow 
pace.6
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Behind Hinton, the vehicles of the 82nd AAA (anti­
aircraft artillery) Battalion began to blast the surrounding 
hillsides with concentrated fire from their twin-4Omm 
cannons and Quad-.50 machineguns. Commanding the 82nd AAA 
was Lt. Colonel Walter Killilae and he remembered the 
battle:
We were receiving small arms and machinegun fire 
from what appeared to be small hay stacks. I got 
out of my jeep and ran to an M-19 to direct its 
fire on the stacks. The Chinese fire slackened, 
and the column began moving again. Further down 
the road, the mortar and machinegun fire became so 
intense that I dived into a ditch on the left side 
of the road. I and Colonel Messinger [Executive 
Officer for the 9th Regiment] were cowering there 
when John Hector, CO of the 37th Field Artillery 
came along. He suggested that we get out and help 
him to try and get the stalled column moving 
again. I credit him with saving our lives, as we 
would have surely been killed had we stayed where 
we were.7
19 year-old Billy Smith was a Corporal in the 9th
Regiment's Reconaissance Company, and he and his comrades
found themselves with Killilae's AW vehicles.
The road was total gridlock. You could have 
walked faster than that column was moving. A 
particularly heavy concentration of fire knocked 
our jeep off the side of the road, and we found 
ourselves next to this M-19 [anti-aircraft 
vehicle]. That M-19 was blasting away at the 
Chinese with its 40mm cannons, and soon the 
Chinese fire died down. My squad leader had 
fought in World War II, and he told us to stay 
together, and stay close to that M-19. And so we 
did. Every time we took fire, those twin 40's 
would knock out the Chinese gun. And when the 
Chinese tried to rush the M-19, we drove them off 
with our small arms fire. We made a pretty good 
team, and we managed to make it through the
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Chinese fire gauntlet.8
Other surviving members of the 9th Infantry Regiment 
were also trying to make their way out. PFC Robert Bruce,
.1
in spite of his wounded hands, had been assigned to drive a 
2 1/2 ton truck filled with other wounded men. When the 
Chinese ambush took place, the truck that was just a few 
feet in front of Bruce on the jammed road, was struck on 
both sides by Chinese machinegun fire. The men inside the 
truck were literally blown apart by the concentrated fire, 
and their blood splattered across Bruce's windshield. The 
stricken vehicle began to burn, and Bruce could see that 
there were still wounded men inside it.9
Stopping his truck, Bruce started to climb down, and 
try to rescue some of the men. But an officer came running 
up from one of the vehicles behind Bruce, and screamed at 
him to get back in the truck and keep moving. "The only 
chance we have", the officer told Bruce, "is to keep this 
damn column moving. You are not to stop for anything, and 
that's an order!" Bruce climbed back into the driver's 
seat, shifted his truck into low gear, and managed to 
maneuver it around the burning vehicle in front of him. The 
screams of the wounded men slowly burning to death in the 
truck would stay with him forever.10
By this time, the entire road was clogged with burning 
vehicles, and the roadside ditches filled with the charred
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and bloodied remains of their former occupants. Many of 
these hideously wounded men were not dead, however, but 
rather lay screaming in agony alongside the road. Bullets 
began slamming into Bruce's truck, and screams from behind 
him signaled that the wounded men in the back of the truck 
were being hit.
There seemed to be no way out of this trap to Bruce, as 
another vehicle to his front was struck by a Chinese mortar 
round and literally disintegrated in a blinding flash.
Bruce swerved his big truck around the flaming debris, the 
sickening thud of his tires running over the bodies of 
American soldiers filling his ears. Whether the men on the 
roadside that he had just run over were dead, or only 
wounded, Bruce tried not to think about. His responsibility 
was to the men in his truck.
In addition to the litter cases in the back of the 
truck, Bruce had three other men piled into the cab of the 
vehicle with him, all pounded, and all just as scared as he 
was. Though his hands hurt, it was Bruce's head that ached 
horribly now. The concussion he had suffered from the 
Chinese hand grenade five days earlier still pained him, and 
the inside of his ears had begun to bleed as well, the blood 
running in little streams down the sides of his cheeks. The 
man next to Bruce was the calmest of the group, and he kept 
repeating in a soothing voice: "Just get us out of here
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Bobby, just get us out of here Bobby."11
Weaving the big truck down the icy road, dodging 
Chinese machinegun and mortar fire, as well as the other 
vehicles in the column, Bruce finally drove through the 
narrow pass that marked the end of the Chinese ambush area. 
Bruce skidded to a stop on the icy road, as he reached the 
position of the British 27th Brigade, which was trying to 
hold open the south end of the ambush area for the trapped 
Americans.
Bruce nursed his badly damaged truck to a nearby aid 
station, which was already overflowing with casualties.
Bruce told the orderlies at the aid station that he had a 
truckful of wounded men, and several of the orderlies came 
over to his truck to help unload the litter cases. When 
they dropped the gate on the back of the truck, however, 
their eyes were met with a scene of utter horror. Almost 
everyone in the back of the truck had been struck by Chinese 
fire coming through the ambush. Blood stood several inches 
deep on the floor of the truck and many of the men were 
dead. Bruce recoiled back from the sight, staggered away, 
and began vomiting. His ears began to bleed again.12
Other men had their trucks hit and disabled.
Abandoning their knocked out vehicles, these men walked 
along the road, desperately seeking another vehicle to climb 
aboard. Some scrambled aboard passing trucks, others were
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savagely kicked or punched, and knocked away from already 
overcrowded vehicles.
Staff Sergeant Robert Hammersmith came through the 
Chinese ambush on foot, leading his squad, and firing into 
the hills at the Chinese. Laying alongside the road were a 
group of wounded men, and one of them recognized him. 
"Hammer!" the man called out. Hammersmith walked over, and 
saw that the soldier was a man from his company. The man 
(both he and Hammersmith were 18 years old at the time) was 
crying, and cradling his arm, as he had been shot through 
the elbow. "I'm scared Hammer," the man sobbed. "It's 
going to be alright," Hammersmith replied. Just then, a 
truck carrying wounded men was forced to halt near them, as 
the motor column continued its "herky-jerky" pace through 
the ambush.13
When the truck halted, Hammersmith helped his wounded 
friend to his feet, and walked him over to the back of the 
truck. "There's no damn room here!" one of the riders 
snarled at Hammersmith as he tried to put his wounded friend 
aboard. Noticing that the person who had spoken was not 
wounded, Hammersmith told the man to get out of the truck 
and let the wounded man aboard. When the man responded with 
further obscenities, Hammersmith reached up, grabbed the man 
by his shirt collar, and yanked him out of the truck, 
sending him sprawling onto the road. Then Hammermith
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boosted his friend up into the truck, and told him to stay 
there. "And that was the last I ever saw of the man," 
Hammersmith recalled of his friend.14
To the north, Colonel Paul Freeman's 23rd Infantry 
Regiment was continuing to hold off the pursuing Chinese, 
and protect the division artillery, which was placed under 
his care until it could move south. But as Freeman's men 
fought off attack after attack, their attention was being 
drawn to the scene of horror unfolding behind them. As 
minutes became hours, Freeman still awaited word authorizing 
him to withdraw. But the sounds of battle continued to 
drift up to him, and the smoke from burning vehicles could 
be clearly seen in the dull November skies. Freeman was not 
sure exactly what was happening on the south road to 
Sunchon, but he feared the worst. Casting an anxious eye at 
the sun which now was sinking in the leaden Korean skies, 
Freeman knew he had to act. The Chinese had been hitting 
him with heavy attacks in broad daylight. If they were this 
strong during the day, then God help him when nightfall 
came.15
Freeman called a conference with his battalion 
commanders, as well as the artillery battalion commanders, 
and other various infantry elements awaiting their turn to 
move south to Sunchon. Freeman told them that he felt that 
the road south was hopelessly blocked, and that there was no
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way they could make it out before sundown. Freeman then 
notified them that he had received authorization from 
division headquarters to withdraw down the alternate retreat 
route to the west through Anju. The other commanders not 
attached to the 23rd Infantry Regiment balked at Freeman's 
suggestion because they had orders to use the south road. 
Freeman told them to do what they wanted, but that he was 
pulling out and moving west before nightfall.16
Behind the cover of a thunderous artillery barrage laid 
down by the remaining artillery, Freeman and the 2 3rd moved 
west to safety. The Second Division artillery, as well as 
what was left of the 9th Regiment, the 2nd Engineer Combat 
Battalion, and other service units were unable to clear the 
trap before darkness. These men would spend the night of 
November 30, 1950, in Hell.
As night fell across the battlefield, the U.S. aircraft 
that had been protecting the column were forced to return to 
base, leaving the survivors of the Second Infantry Division 
to fend for themselves. Incredibly, although no other unit 
of Eighth Army was engaged in battle on the night of 
November 30, no attempt was made by Eighth Army high command 
to organize a relief column to rescue the trapped remnants 
of the Second Infantry Division.17 The men of the Second 
were abandoned to their fate.
Sergeant Harry Lohmeyer of the 2nd Engineers was one of
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those still on the road when night fell:
It was after dark when our vehicles began moving 
towards the pass ctt the end of the gauntlet. As 
we neared it, the enemy took charge and blew us to 
Hell. People, equipment, vehicles were blowing 
up, tracers all around. The Chinese charged down 
the hillsides right at us. Our artillery 
uncoupled from their trucks, lowered their sights 
and fired point blank into the Chinese. Great 
balls of flame rolled along the ground at the 
oncoming enemy. We were ordered out of the 
trucks, and after that it was every man for 
himself. The Chinese were all over us, and the 
fighting became hand-to-hand. In the pitch black 
darkness, it was difficult to distinguish friend 
from foe and I remember grabbing men by the neck 
to check for dog tags, before killing them. A 
couple of us managed to clear the melee, and moved 
west over the hills. We walked all that night, 
and well into the next day. After about 18 hours, 
a U.S. plane spotted us, and dropped messages 
telling us which direction to go in and the enemy 
locations. When we finally linked up with a First 
Cavalry Division patrol, I had just two rounds of 
ammo left.18
Not all of the men trapped on the road on the night of 
November 30, 1950, were as fortunate as Lohmeyer. PFC Thomas 
Kappell, also a member of the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, 
was in a truck several hundred yards behind Lohmeyer, when 
the Chinese rushed the column. After engaging in desperate 
hand-to-hand combat, Kappell and several other members of 
his platoon broke free and headed into the hills. There 
they joined up with other stragglers, until they had a group 
of almost one hundred men, which included many South 
Koreans. A lieutenant was the ranking member of the group, 
and so he assumed command. Kappell recalled that the
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lieutenant was very inexperienced, and had apparently become 
confused during the battle. As a result, when the 
lieutenant led the group away from the ambush area, instead 
of heading south to safety, he took them north by mistake.19
Kappell's ragged band staggered into a North Korean 
village, shortly after dawn on December 1. They thought 
they had reached friendly lines, but then Chinese soldiers 
began emerging from the small huts, and Kappell suddenly 
realized that they had stumbled into an enemy held village. 
Kappell's group tried to remain calm and, keeping their 
heads down and not speaking, they tried to walk right on 
through the village. At first the bluff worked, as the 
half-light of dawn combined with the presence of the South 
Koreans in the group to conceal their identity. Right at 
the edge of the village, however, a suspicious Chinese 
sentry challenged the group. One of the South Koreans spoke 
Chinese, and he tried to answer the sentry. Kappell was not 
sure exactly what was said but, whatever it was, it didn't 
lower the suspicions of the sentry, who called out to the 
other guards nearby.20
At that point, everyone decided that the "jig was up", 
and took off running. The startled sentries fired wildly, 
and Kappell's group raced out of the village. Emerging from 
the village, however, Kappell discovered that the hamlet was 
just one small part of a vast encampment of Chinese, which
175
they had foolishly walked right into the middle of.
As bugles began to blare, and Chinese machinegun 
bullets began tearing through the air around them, Kappell 
and the others saw a railroad tunnel, with what looked to be 
Chinese railroad workers milling about the entrance, 
approximately 800 yards away. Assuming that troops working 
on the railroad would be less heavily armed than normal 
Chinese infantry, Kappell and the others ran towards the 
tunnel, hoping to at least find cover from the fire of the 
pursuing Chinese from the village, and perhaps even find a 
train to commandeer.
After running several hundred yards towards the tunnel, 
however, several hidden Chinese machineguns emplaced near 
the entrance of the tunnel opened fire on Kappell's group. 
These machineguns cut down several men and the others dove 
onto the hard, frozen ground, as bullets whizzed over their 
heads. With absolutely no cover, and completely surrounded 
by literally thousands of Chinese, the decision was made to 
surrender. One of the South Koreans, who spoke Chinese, 
called out that they and the Americans wanted to surrender, 
and the Chinese machinegunners ceased firing. By this time, 
however, the Chinese troops in the village had caught up 
with Kappell's group, and were firing at them. Many of the 
bullets from the pursuing Chinese went high, and landed 
among the Chinese machinegunners in front of Kappell.21
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Thinking that the Americans had started shooting at 
them again, the Chinese machingunners opened fire once more, 
raking the ground with bulletts. Caught in a vicious cross­
fire, Kappell was struck through the foot, but dozens of 
other men were cut to shreds. Grabbing several of the dead 
men, Kappell piled their lifeless bodies on top of himself 
as a shield against the bullets, and then lay still for what 
seemed like an eternity. Finally, the Chinese fire 
slackened, and then stopped. Kappell waited breathlessly, 
praying that he would somehow live through this nightmare. 
There was a sudden babbling of oriental voices near him, and 
then the bodies on top of him were yanked clear, and Kappell 
stared up into the barrells of Chinese rifles and sub- 
machineguns pointed straight at him. Kappell was taken 
prisoner, but of the approximately 100 men who had broke 
free of the gauntlet with him, only three others remained 
alive. Kappell was transported north several days later, 
and would spend the rest of the war in a prison camp.22
Late on the evening of November 30, 1950, Captain 
Reginald Hinton pulled up in his bullet-riddled jeep, at a 
headquarters tent belonging to an Eighth Army engineer unit. 
Hoping that the engineers might be able to tell him where he 
could locate other elements of the Second Infantry Division, 
Hinton climbed out of his jeep, and walked into the tent.
Hinton was bedraggled, and haggard looking after five
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days and nights of battle. His uniform was filthy and 
stained with blood from his wounded wrist, which had been 
shattered by a Chinese bullet during the ambush. Hinton's 
appearance startled the clean-cut engineers as he strode 
into their immaculate tent. "Could you tell me where the
.i
Second Infantry Division is reforming at?", Hinton asked. 
"You from the Second Division?", the engineer's commanding 
officer asked in an astounded tone. Hinton wearily shook 
his head in the affirmative. "We just heard they got wiped 
out!" the engineer exclaimed. "No," Hinton replied, "we're 
still here."23
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CHAPTER VII
AFTERMATH
"There stood before General Dumas a man in a ragged brown 
coat, dishevelled/ his eyes red rimmed and glaring.
Underneath his coat he wore the rags and shreds of 
a discolored and filthy uniform. 'Here I am then,' the 
newcomer exclaimed. 'But who are you?' the general cried."
'What! Don't you recognize me? I am Marshal Ney: the 
rearguard of the Grand Army! I have fired the last shot 
on the bridge at Kovno. I have thrown the last of our 
muskets into the Niemen and have made my way here 
across a hundred fields of snow.'"
Raymond Horricks, Marshal Nev
The heroic delaying action fought by the men of the 
United States Second Infantry Division in the Battle of the 
Chongchon River, greatly slowed the Chinese Second Phase 
Offensive and helped to save the Eighth United States Army 
in Korea from destruction. Thus the main objective of the 
Chinese offensive was foiled.1 But the price paid by the 
Second Infantry Division was heavy.
Out of a pre-battle strength of approximately 15,000 
men, the Second Infantry Division lost over 4,500 soldiers 
killed, wounded, or missing in the Battle of the Chongchon 
River.2 This staggering total remains the heaviest 
casualties ever suffered by a United States Army or Marine 
Corps division in a single engagement in the post-World War 
II era. This shocking "butcher's bill", and the disastrous 
ambush on the Kunu-ri - Sunchon road, would cost Major
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General Laurence Keiser his command.
Officially, Keiser was evacuated to Japan from Korea 
for treatment of pneumonia, and on December 5, 1950, was 
relieved of his command by Eighth Army commander Lieutenant 
General Walton Walker.3 S.L.A. Marshall, who was in Korea 
when Keiser was relieved, relates that Keiser went out of 
his way to demonstrate to him that he was not ill. Keiser 
was angry, Marshall reported, and felt like he was being 
made the scapegoat for the Second Division's defeat at the 
Chongchon River.4 Keiser retired from the United States 
Army in 1954, a broken man.
Eighth Army commander, Lieutenant General Walton 
Walker, was killed in a jeep accident just weeks after he 
had relieved Keiser of his command. MacArthur replaced 
Walker with Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway. In an 
effort to better understand his new command, Ridgway wrote 
to his former West Point classmate, Laurence Keiser, asking 
him for information about what had happened along the 
Chongchon River. Keiser never replied and years later would 
remark about the battle: "It is over— it is done. Let it 
lie. "5
Although Keiser lost his command, some of the highest 
ranking officers to serve in Korea praised the Second 
Infantry Division for its valor in the Battle of the 
Chongchon River. United Nations Supreme Commander General
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Douglas MacArthur, described the Second Infantry Division's 
battle as a "notable rearguard action which enabled the 
Eighth Army to break contact and avoid any enemy flanking 
movement."6 General Matthew Ridgway, Walker's and later 
MacArthur's replacement, called the Second Infantry a 
"gallant division" that was "badly mauled...as it was 
holding the Chongchon River so the balance of Eighth Army 
could cross."7
General Paik Sun Yup, commanding general of the ROK 1st 
Division at the time of the battle, and destined to rise to 
supreme command of the South Korean army wrote: "The U.S.
2nd Division propped up the unraveling line (at the Battle 
of the Chongchon River) until the very last minute."8
In December 1950, the Second Infantry Division's war 
was far from over, and in the month's that followed it would 
avenge its losses at the Battle of the Chongchon River.
From January 31 - February 15, 1951, the Second Division's 
23rd Infantry Regiment made a glorious stand at the siege of 
Chipyong-ni. Surrounded by five Chinese divisions, the men 
of the 2 3rd Regiment turned back wave after wave of Chinese 
attackers at bayonet-point. When the battle ended, 7,855 
Chinese corpses lay strewn across the Korean countryside.9
When spring came to Korea in 1951, the Chinese made 
what would turn out to be their last attempt to achieve a 
military victory in the Korean War. Smoke from forest fires
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again filled the skies over Korea, as 12 0,000 Chinese 
soldiers massed in front of the U.S. Second Infantry 
Division and the ROK III Corps. A captured enemy officer 
revealed that the objective of the forthcoming Chinese 
attack was to destroy the Second Infantry Division for 
having disrupted so many former Chinese offensives.10
The Chinese assault began on May 15, 1951, and appeared 
to be an exact replica of their plan of attack at the 
Chongchon River. A massive blow shattered the ROK III 
Corps, exposing the Second Division's right flank and again 
threatening it with encirclement and destruction. But the 
men of the Second Division had learned much about their 
Chinese foe during the past six months.
Because of their experience at the Chongchon River, the 
men of the Second Infantry Division had anticipated the 
attack against their flank, and had already formed a 
defensive line along that sector, complete with barbed wire 
and minefields. Wave after wave of Chinese slammed into the 
Second Division, but they were thrown backward by a 
hailstorm of artillery and small arms fire. When the smoke 
of the battlefield cleared on May 22, 1951, a shocking total 
of 90,000 Chinese lay dead or wounded in front of the lines 
of the Second Infantry Division.11
In conclusion, it is apparent from the evidence I have 
presented in this thesis, that the officers and men of the
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United States Second Infantry Division fought bravely at the 
Battle of the Chongchon River and performed their duty in 
the highest traditions of the United States Army. The 
defeat of the Second Infantry Division at the Chongchon 
River may be attributed to the overwhelming numerical 
superiority of a veteran Chinese army, combined with the 
suddenness of the enemy's offensive, his having completely 
surprised the Americans, and the novelty of his tactics.
In spite its tactical defeat along the Chongchon the 
Second Infantry Division still helped deny the enemy his 
ultimate objective of destroying the Eighth Army. Although 
the battle was lost, honor was not. It is my hope that this 
thesis will help to insure that the courageous men of the 
United States Second Infantry Division, will forever be 
remembered for their epic struggle with the Chinese along 
the banks of the Chongchon River.
These courageous men walk among us yet today, and 
behind the kindly eyes of grandfathers, one can still see 
the fire of the warrior's soul. These men remember a time 
when the snows of Korea were stained red with the blood of 
heroes. It was a time for courage. It was a time for 
sacrifice. It was the time of the Dragon.
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